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Friday: Junc 26, 1891. 
.TIIE 1 1 0 s ~  Hos. TIIE XARQIJIS OF RIPON, K.G., G.C.S.I., c.I.E., 
in thc Chiir. 
THE SUPREJIACY OF THE NAVY FOR I;\IPER,IAL 
DEFENCE. 
DF Licutcnnnt-Gcncral Sir  IT. F. DEUJIXOSD JESTOIS, G.C.X.G., C.B. . .  ’  lie CJTAXRXAS : Ladies and entlemen, I do not t y i k  that there is any necessity 
for my introducing Sir William fervois to this or to any othcr meeting of those who 
are interested in the atatc of our defenccs, bccnuse we all know wry  well the dccp 
sttention which hc has given now for n grcat number of years to that  eubject. I 
recollect, when he was quitc s young Oficei, how he wa3 tho heart and soul of the 
erecutire work of c a q i n g  out the great scliemc of fortilieation which was innugu- 
n t cd  by Lord Palmerston’s fforernment; and from tlut day to  thi3 he has given. 
his attention, as we nrc all personally omre, to  the subject of our Kational Defenec. 
IIc will speak to us not only with his great espcriencc a3 an Engineer Olliccr, but 
:ilso as one who has gorerned some of our most important Colonies, and who has 
tlicrc become pcrfcctlr acquainted with the feelings of thoec Colonie~ ond with 
their wishes and dcsircs on thc subject of defence. We all know  cry well that 
those feelings, thosc wishes and desires, must be fully considered and regarded in 
my Echcmc of defence which this country may introduce. A t  the samo time, he 
1103 also had the opportunity cf understanding fully thc work which ia being donc 
by tlic British Kavy in nll parts of thc world, and in those circumstances he certainly 
has rerj  special quali5cations for spcaking to u. 1 haw had the advantage Of 
glancing a t  the paper, and although it is not for mo to express any opinion upon it, 
at all events at this stage of our proceedings, I may say it is o paper full of interest 
and one which is likely to girc rise to a rery important and interesting discussion. 
IT is lini*ill~ necessary to impress upon any English audience, aud least 
of,all upon an audiencc composed of membcrs of the United Scrrice 
Institution, the vast importancc of tho question of thc Defence of tho 
British Empire. That such dcfcnces should bc necessary is, indccd, 
x mclanclioly fact. Onc might have cxpccted that, as science, civiliza- 
tion, and facilities for communication progrcsscd, maukind would 
have become niore peaceable, and havc realized more and morc their 
eommon brotherhood. But what do vie sec ? Tho railways which 
nrc constructed for tho promotion of trade becomc thc means whereby 
cvcr-increasing armies can bc transported ; tho ncwcst discoveries in 
connection with the forging of iron and steel arc applied, not only in 
producing armour-plates of cnormous thickness, but also at the same 
time in making morelpowerful cn,@cs to piercc them; amongst tho 
sciences which Lare been most rapidly dcvclopcd arc artillery. of 
almost fabulous .nngc and powcr for servicc aborc water, qnd 
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8 i 0  TIIE SUPREJIACT OF THE S A Y S  
cnginecring foi. scrvice below iratcr, wvhcrcby ships may bc scnt to 
thc bottom. 'l'hc intcllcct of man has, indccd, bccn devoted to tile 
devising and improring of frcsli nicans of dcstruction, and my list 
might bc almost indcfinitclg incrcascd. 1x1 this 169lst ycar of 
L'peac~ on earth, good will towards men" wc scc tho so-called 
Christian nations of tlic morld armcd to tho tccth and ready to fly at 
onc nnotlicr in a manncr ,to which history affords no pnrallcl. 
So long as tlic prcscnt condition of things remains-and I scc no 
probability of its bcing brought to a tcrnination-so long is Great 
Britain bound'io tnkc thc neccssair stcps for tlic protection of her 
intcrests, mhcrcrcr thosc intcrcsts may lic. And, indccd, thcy arc 
world-midc. Thcy includc not only tlic motlier-country, but :Jso tho 
Tarious rontcs of coinmci'cc, whcrcby supplics of food and otlic1- 
csscntials ;ire brought to tlic British IsIcs, and our mannfactuird 
goods conrcycd t o  distant .lands; tlic ilcfcncc of a rnst Iudian 
Empire; niid of our Colonics and coaling stntions in crcry quartcr of 
nut, althongh it is trnc,that thc qucstion of defcnco can ncrcr be 
thoronglily invcstigatcd unlcss it is rcgarded from an 'Imperial point 
of vicw, I do not wish to alarm this distinguishcd nudiciico by tho 
cxprcssion of an intcntion to go into thc wholc subject this aftcrnoon. 
To do so in an hour would bo impossiblc, and all tliat I can hope 
in  tho short timc a t  my disposal is to makc ;I few remarks upon tho 
qucstion wdiicli will, I trust, call forth discussion. 
. I t  is obvions to rcmark that TTC mrst havc n Xarg to protect our 
intcrcsts a t  scn, whilst our Army dcfcnds us on land. But bcsidcs tho 
Navy and h m y ,  wi'e liar0 fortifications. Now, thc great object of 
these fortifications is thc protection of our naval stationsand harbours. 
Thus, thc fortifications of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Pcmbrokc, Portland, 
Cork, thc AIcdmy, and othcr plnccs a t  hornc; of Gibialtar and Naltn, 
in tlic lreditcrrancan; of Halifax and Bermuda, in tho Atlantic; of 
Sierra Leonc and St. Helena, also in thc Atlantic, on tho ray  to the 
C a p ;  of Port Ropl ,  Jamaica, and Port Castries a t  St. Lucia, in 
the Wcst Indics; of Adcn and Bombay, Colombo and Trincomalcc, 
Sifigaporc, Hong Kong, arid the 3fauritins, in tlic East; of the C a p ,  at  
the turning point between the Eastcrn mid' Wcstcm seas ; tlicse, as 
vicll as the fortifications of Nclbournc, Sjdncy, Adclnidc, nrisbnnc, 
and Hobart, ip Australia, nnd of Auckland, IVcllington, Lyttelton, 
and Duncdin, in n'cn- Zealand, arc "part and parcel ." of our naval 
defences. 
Tho principal reason for tho fortification of thcsc harbours is, that  
thcy arc csscntinl as liascs of action for our ships of war, and as storc- 
houscs wIIcre'coa1 and otlicr matcrial'for thc usc of t.liosc ships may 
be kepb in redincis. If thcy were not so defended, tho vcsscls of war 
would bc ticd down to protect thcm, and would' bc unablc, Fithout 
running' thc'risk of a liostilo occupation of 'thcir bases'of action, o r  
tlic ilcst.ruction of tlicir stores, to  go wlicrcver rcquirc? on tho im- 
. It was this consideration which led Lord Palmcrston, icting on tho 
Report of thc .Commission of 1859, to car$- out tho plan for tho forti- 
t l l C  globe. * . .  
. portant duties with which thcy aro cliirgcd. 
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FOR JJIPERIAL DEFESCE. S i 1  
fieation O f  ?Ur homc n a d  stations. Subsequently, tho fol.ti6cation 
of our coal~ng stations abroad \ F ~ R  taken i n  hand; in Some cases 
,dditionS arid impi.oremcnts, in otlicrs total reconstruction, being 
nNcssnry. Into tlic details of works wliicli wcro nndcrtnkcn somc 
tbirtF years ngo I do not proposc IIOW to cntcr. But I may remark in 
pk<$ng tlint I am fullr prcparcd to jnstify tlic scllcmc as ~ ~ h o l c ,  
sn(l to sliom tlint, althongli no doubt somc mistnkcs wcrc mado in tlic 
w q i n g  of it out, :is in a11 other things Iinninn, still these dcfcnccs 
&tli~i. now fulfil, or may easily bc mndo capable of fnlfilling, the ends 
for diicli  thcy wcrc dcsigncd ; and that tlicir cost to tlic countrj-, 
when considcrcd with rcfcrcnco to tho total cspcnditurc of tho Army 
and K n v ,  has been cnormously C X n g g C K l t C d .  
Towards tho closc of last Session, o Itcturn rras Inid ilpon the 
bblo of tlic IIouso of Commons, of thc nmount of moncy which 
b c n  spent on fortifications, gcns, nnd otlicr npplianccs for thcrll, 
since t h o  rccommcnilations of tlic R o p 1  Corriniissioii of 1859. I t  
stated that tho sums spcnt during that pcriod had bccn- 
For fortifications .......................... rE12,lS 4416 
Fcr guns, mountings, and tlicir cquipmcnt ... 5,484,810 
Total.. ............ ;C17,639,226 - 
During tho snrnc pcriod, thcrc lias bccn cspcnded for fhc Army 
nnd Navy a sum (cxclusivc of thc nct cstimntcd cspcnditnro for 
Thus, it will bc sccn that thc total outlay for, d i n t  may bc tcrmcd, 
the “plant” for tlic dcfencc of tho Empirc has only bccn about 
2 pcr cent. of tho total naval and militaryeipcnditurc up to tlic 
prcscnt timc. Remcmbcr that that is not only as regards tho defences 
of our homo nwnl stations, bu t  inclndcs thc defences of our coaling 
stations nbroail, and tlint, as timo goes on, tlic pcrccntagc will dccrcasc. 
Fortification is, howmr, bnt onc of several ncccssary clcmcnts in 
our dcfcnsirc sxstcm. A great dcal is rrrittcn and niucli is said 
about fox& versus ships, and about thc Army vcrsi(s the Nary, in 
short, about onc clcmcnt of our military system ccrsris another 
elcmcnt. Thc fact is, ho-mrer, that.tlicrc is no cersiis in thcsc 
matters. All thc clcmcnts of tho military scrricc-I use tho term 
“military ” in its comprclicnsivc scnsc-arc required in due dcgrec 
and in their propcr places. 
I nccd hardly say that, crcn whcn complctcd and equipped with all 
neccssnry armaments, fortifications arc usclcss unlcss provided with 
efficient garrisons. It is of tbcsc garrisons that I now wish to spcak. 
What slionld bc their Ktrcngth?. Whcncc should they be drawn? 
Under wlioso dircctions hiid t h y  bcst be placed? In discussing 
tlicsc questions, vie should put nsidc all considcrations rclating to the 
respcctivo intcrcjts of thc Farions branches of tlio United Service. 
What TFC havc’to considcr is tho protection of the State. Tho duties 
of tho Army and Nmy rcspcctivcly, both at  home and abroad, and 
the relations which thoso forces should bear to each othcr, should be 
1691-92) of 827,441,145I. 
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Si1  TLIE SUPREMAGS OF T I E  X h V Y  
rcgardcd solely with tlic objcct of obtaining tlie requirod rcsnlts fl.om 
their uxiitcd cfforts in tho most eficicnt, and, a t  tlie Enmc time, 
cconornicd manncr, thnt can bc devised. Wc slionld first nsccrtail, 
fairly what it is that wc want, and tlicri provido it in tlic manner 
best suited to our ciizumstnnccs. 
In carrying out our dcfensivc policy, liowcver, we mix up tile 
dutics of ifary nnd Army in a maniicr whicli docs not conducc to the 
work being done cflicicntly. Our warlikc arrangements, donbtlcse, 
nro intricatc, for with us cvcrything relating to tlicm is voluntary, 
whilst we linrc to providc for tlic dcfcnco of n world-wide Empire ill 
wliicli every kind of climate is included. Complicatcd ns our dc. 
fcnsit-c systcm is, it would naturally l i a ~ c  bccn thong\$ that i t  w-oulcl 
linyc bccn our  aim as much ns possiblc to simplify it. This, Iiow. 
over, is not tho casc. Tlio forccs on whicli wc rely for protcctioll 
nrc administercd by txro scparato departments of tho Statc, whicll 
nrc not brought into harmony with each otlicr, and arc not 80 
organized that each may bcst pcrform its propcr function. Such, :it 
all crcnts, is tlic view cxpresscd by tlic Commission prcsidcd over bj- 
Lord Hnrtington in 1888. 
Tliat Comniission justly tcrmcd tlic prcscnt system of divided 
rcspbnsibility ‘( nu unsatisfactory and dangerous condition of affairv,” 
arid procceded to discuss two schcmcs mliicli lind Lccn suggcstcd fop 
rcmcdJ-ing it. Each of tlicm practically. involved tlio proposal to 
plncc both Army and N a ~ y  undcr one IIinister. Thcy wcrc as 
folloms :- 
1st. That n Minister slionld be nppointcd, wlio \\-ouId bc tlic 
supreme and rcsponsiblu liead of the Army and Nary, tho immcdiatc 
control of cacli Scrricc being entrusted to a profcssioual Officer. 
2nd. That each dcpartmcnt should bc entrusted to tlic snprcmc 
and rcsponsiblc controt of a profcssionnl ~icnd, who would sit in tlie 1 
House of Lords, nnd that n link betwccn tho two should bc snpplicd 
by the appointment of a civilian Jlinistcr, who would sit in tho Liousc 
of Commons. 
‘I‘o both thcsc proposals, howcrcr, tho Cornmissioncrs strongly 
ol$xtzd. They statcd somewhat at Icngth tlic grounds of tlicii. 
objections, adding, “ undcr the circumstances, mc consider that 
remedy for the undoubtcd crils which harc bccn brought undcr 
oiir notico must be sought in otlicr dircctions.” 
But, nlthough tlic Commission rejcctcd both the sclicmcs proposcd, 
tlq- did not suggcst any othcr. Doubtless they had good reasons 
for not doing 60. At any ,rate, tlicy harc lcft i t  for otliers to seek 
thc dcsircd rcmcdx; and this will probably bcst bc found by frcc and 
full discussion a t  gathcrings such :is n-c hare here to-dnj-. 
In  thc first plncc, we must 1mr in mind that thc rcquircmcnts for 
tlic protection of tlic Uritisli Ernpirc aro cntircly different from those 
of othcr Europcan Po\rcrs. Germany and Francc, for instancc, arc 
military nations. ’ Tlicy ,ham cstcneirc land fronticrs, atid maintain 
ciiorxnous armics. Nercrtliclcss, thcy cutrust the dcfcncc of thcir 
harbours and coasts to tlic n’nval Dcpartmcnt. I linvc heard it said 
that, ns tkesc countries, idiich arc military nations, cntrust tllo 
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FOR IJLPERIAL DEFESCE. 8 i 3  
(lefcncc of tlicir scaboard to the Ifa~y, SO WC, being naral nation, 
,hoIl~d cmploy tho Army on this dlity. unablc 
to flnderstad tho logic of this view. It appcars to mc, indeed, that 
conclusion should LO just t110 rcrersc, and that, as wc aro 0 nayal 
po,,-Cr, w t h  n Flcct wliich is ubiquitous, there is a11 tho marc rcnson 
for proTiding for oiir dcfcncc ns far as possiblo on basis. 
Cosst dcfcncc for Gcrmany is mai?ly against iilvasion on t-lcir 
frontier, nrid tlicrc \\.auld bo nothing anomalous in placing sucIi 
&fence in tlic hands of tho Army. But thc Germans say tllat tho 
xa\-y must necessarily bc able to do tlic work much better, Coast 
defcncc in tlic l3ritiSh Empire is priiiiuri~y thc dcfcuco of na\-nl basts 
raids. If, thcrefoiv, i t  is advisablc in Gcrxnnny to place coast 
(icfCncc in nnval hands, d forfiori should Uritish coast dcfc1lcc con- 
ducted by tlic Xnval Department ; bccauso not only do all the con- 
ditions which pmd1lcc ~dralltagc in the of Germany opcmtc in 
tllis couiitrj, but a number vf other corirlitioiis arise out of tho fact 
that obviously tlic basc niid tho forcc operating thercfroxn should bo 
ulldcr onc suprcnic command. Commander of an 
8riny in tlic field who practically could not scnd an order to llis 
base ! 
Tho Army of England, bc it obscrvcd, docs not ncccssarily conic 
iiito play for tlic tlcfcncc of tlic United Kingdom, except on tho sup- 
position that our Xavy ]ins bccn defeatcd or out-manccuvrcd, or that, 
, 01cing to tho insuficiency and abscncc of good nrxxingcmcnt of our 
c3nst dcfcnces, tho couiitry itself has bccomc tlic sccnc of military 
opcrations. Tho British Army in tho Unitcd Kingdom must, boll-- 
cvcr, garrison certain placcs in  Exiglnnd, Scotland, and Ircland, and, 
i t  is almost riccdlcss to say, has It 
~q- also be rcquircd for any land crpcdition on which it may LO 
dctcrmincd to scnd part of it ; and has, (luring tlic life-timc of most 
of us, bccn tliiis successfully engaged. nut crcn in thoso espcditions 
in which Innd operations formed part, niuch Lrts bccn successfully 
iiudcrtakcn by naval Commnndcrs and the forccs undcr thcm. I 
n q -  r c f q  to tlic gallant exploits of the latc Sir Wm. Hcirctt up tlio 
?Tiger in 1856; and, moro rcccntly, to thoso of Vice-Admiral Sir 
IVxn. Frcmantlc a t  W t u ,  in Enstcrn Africa. Othcr cascs might be 
addnccd. 
Wliilst tlicn the main duties of our Army arc tlic dcfcncc of India, 
tlic maintcnancc of garrisons within thc Uiiited Kingdom, thc dcfcncc 
of Great Britain undcr certain contingencies, and tlic undertaking 
of m y  cnsnnl cspcdition, it has no function abroad cxccpt thc occnpa- 
tioxi of nnvnl stations. I submit that this function is 0x10 that should 
bo undcrtakcn by foi.ces under thc iTnvnl Department, and that tho 
E C ~  garrisons of n n d  stations a t  Iiomc, ns well as tho dcfcncc of our 
shorcs a t  Lornc, should also be cntrustcd to that Dcpartmcnt. The 
Ravy must bc cmploycd in cvcry part of the world, but that is no 
rcnson, surd)-, why tho Army, too, sl~ould bc ubiquitous. It rcdy 
piizzlcs mc, and I should think must puzzle others, ta nndcrstsnd why, 
complicated ns I hnvu Eaid oiir dcfcnsim system must be, n-o sliould 
render it Inore complcx by insisting on those placcs which ITC hold 
I confcss that I 
Fancy tho C ~ S C  of 
great licld for action in Ixiciia. 
TOL. XXW. 3 0  
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871 THE SUPREJIACY OF THE SAYY 
liurcly for naval purposes, beinn mrrisoncd b j  forces wlioly in: 
dcpondcnt of nnvnl authority. UEiG of sptcm and unity of action, 
not to say incrcascd poi\-cr, ivonld be promotcd b ~ -  tlic garrisons of 
our naval stations cvcr~whcre bcing undcr the same authority as tllc 
ships for mliosc use thoso stations csist and are niuintnincd. Tlicip 
clcfcnce is of ns iriucli conscqucncc to our n’aral Dcpnrtmcnt as tllc 
nnmbcr and dcscription of ships; it is indccd, as I l m c  nlrcady said, 
part and parcel of our naval system. 
At prcscnt the Xaval Dcpnrtmcnt ndriscs, OT is snpposcd to ndrisc, 
tho Aimg Dc~inrtmcnt, as to whero the naval stntions slionld be, 
to  what rstcnt t h y  shall bo fortificd arid nrmcd, and the garrisons 
rcquircd for thcni. One rcsult is, that tlicj- criticizc-somctimcs, 110 
doubt, col*rcctly--thu nicnsurcs carricd out by tlic War Dcp’tmcnt, 
but thcy h a w  no rcsponsibility or nntliority in conncction thcrcwitI1. 
Surely it mould be iiifinitely prcfcrablo that the Xavy sliould bare 
the rcsponsibility cast upon thcm of acting rathci. than tllnt of merclp 
advising; that t h y  themsclvcs should. scttlo evcq-thing rclnting to 
thosc stntions vliich nrc maintnincd solcly for thcir use, nnd tliat 
tlicy should liarc nndcr thcir ordcrs thc garrisons rcquircd to dcfcnd 
thcm. Irrcspcctivc of otlicr considerations, tlic Kaval Dcpartmcnt js 
neccssnrilly capable of understnilding, much bcttcr than h i d  soldiers 
can, thc niovcrucnts of liostilc ships, and is in R position tlic bcttcr to 
provide against attack by thcm. Again, tlic Kavy must know bcttcr 
than tlic Army, when one of their stations is likely to Lo nttackcd, 
and if so, by what force. Farthcr, tlic Navy would not bc obligcd, 
nt times when it wonld bc most inconvcnicnt, supposing it to bc 
possiblc, to convq or convoj- tiwops, not undcr thcir orders, to distant 
stations, for objects dctcnriincd on by another Dcpartmcnt, and of 
which the Admiralty might not approrc. BIorcovcr, the Kavy wonld 
bc nblo muell bcttcr than tlic Army to settle tlic strength of thc 
garrisons :iccording to circumstances, and, if tlicse garrisons mere 
cntire1;y under thcir orders, so to organize thcm that t h y  mi?t tnkc 
portions afloat arid send othcrs asliorc as tlicy might dccm dcsirablc. 
If such advnntagcs wonld rcsult from the adoption of the sclicmc, 
su‘rcly it ought to bc carried out, unlcss it can be shown that  thcrc 
arc insupcrablc objcctions to it. Lct US, thcrcforc, examine the 
objections that nrc miscd. 
3Inriy cmincnt nutliorities say. that tlic h’avnl Dcpnrtrncnt cannot 
undertake the incrcascd rcsponsibility inrolrcd. NOW, I bclicw it 
is gcncrally ndmittcd, by thosc d i o  h a w  dcnlt wit11 the ndministra- 
tion cf affairs on D Inrgc scalc, that a man a t  the head of n dcpart- 
mcnt can nndcrtake any amount of responsibilit~, provided hc 11,~ 
the rcquisitc Rssistancc and proper organization. Tho principle ie 
mcrcly that, d o n  to a ccrtain point, lic knows cvcrj-thing, clcale 
with ewrjthing, that beyond that point, hc absolutely trusts otlicra 
wl10m ha 11as the pomx of nppointing or  rcmoi-ing, according as Ire 
finds thcy we capable of carrying out their sliaro of tlic busincss for 
which, as the head, he is rcsponsiblc. 
In the prcscnt case, in addition to the Officeis noE nt tlic head of 
tlrc mat4ricl and pcrsonncl of thc Nays, thcrc would bc 8 Chicf of the 
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FOR IUI’ERIAL DEFESCE. S i t  
a ningiiificd D.A.G. of Royal Nnrincs, with 8 sufficicnt dcp:lrt. 
lucnt under him, to conduct thc bnsiuess rclating to thc llaval 
shrion gnrrisons and men required for const dcfcncc. Of course, like 
* I l c  liends of all thc other X a d  l)cp:irtrncnts, including thc llcn(1 of 
qersonircl of tho Flcct, hc would be ilndcr tllc coritrol of tilc 
2~c1xn~r:i1ty. Sonic, I know, say, that vast increase of a(lministrnti\-c. 
stnff ,\-onlil bc required at thc Admiralty if thc sclicmc no\:. adb-ocatcd 
,,.crc adopted. Such, IIOIVCFC~, necd iiot bc tlic casso, certainly ]lot ill  
>o Iligh a proportion as tlic incrcasc of pcrsonncl. As  rcgards IF-orkS, 
it would oiily bc ncccssnrr to pi*oridc for an crtcnsion of tlic csistiilg 
\$rol.ks Branch of the Admiraltj-. 
It is nrgcd that wider thc proposed sp tcn i  all tiic bcst nnyal 
0fiicer.s would bc fonnd on shorn, whilst thc Flcct as a11 oficnsivc 
scrricc would suffcr, niid tliat oiir mcn-of-war would bc cntrustcd to 
OfGccrs oT nicdiocrc attainmcnts. KO\\-, I bclicrc that rinval rncn, ns 
mlc, would Eonsidcr snclt an objection tantamonnt to casting a slul. 
upon tlicni, implying, as it docs, an nbscncc of that pridc in tticir 
&ips with wlicli they arc so justly crcditcd. But, setting nsidc t11e 
fact, that tlic @’CatCl’ portion of tlic nicn OE sliorc \vould be 3Iarirics 
under tlic Xaval I)cpcirtmciit, I cannot admit t l in t  thcro is anything 
whatcvcr in this nrgumciit. I linvc licard many criticisms passed 
upou tlio Admiralty, gcncrnlly unjustlg, but I hnrc iicvci* licard it 
. bcforc aclmnccd that t h y  wcrc ixicapablc of selcctingpropcr Ofliccrs 
for tlic scvcral dntics t h y  may bc called upon to discharge. It is 
impossiblc to im:rginc that our Kmal Dcpartnicnt roiild show sac11 
a culpablc \\-calincss of ndmiuistmtion. If existing proniotion rilles 
mc m:iintnincd, Officcrs m i s t  put in fica scrvicc, and thc sliorc-going 
billets ” wonld bc fillcd-partly a t  all evciits-bF half-pay rncn who 
nrc now xasting tho bcst ycars of thcir liws, or arc turned out of thc 
Scrricc when thcy havc still ninny good ycars to giro to tlic State. 
Again, I bclicvc it is said that Xarincs wonld bc Icss fitted for tlic 
work than troops of thc Arms. Is this so ? Which is most likcly to 
takc to gnrrison work Kith most zeal--a man to idiom such ivork 
prcscnts itsclf as an cnforcccl clnty, dctaining him from wh:it lie 
rcgnrds <ns the inorc showy ficld work to wliich 110 is constantly 
aspiring, rvho looks for his promotion purcly to clntics pcrformcd 
whcn bc has lcft thc n a r d  station, and who has, may bc, hardly 
timc to learn his garrison work bcforc 110 is ordcrcd away to a inorc 
ccingcnial sphcrc; or a man mlio has entered thc Scrvicc with the 
avowed intention of confining kimsclf to coast defe’clicc aud naval 
~ o r k ,  lins madc tlint thc object of h i s  studies, and, morcovcr, looks 
cntircly to tliat datx as tho nienns through which 11s may obtain 
fanic and promotion ? 
A t  prcscnt it is a grcat disaclvnntagc to tho garrison scrvico on a 
n a r d  station that it is intcrchnngcablc with field duty. A Jiorse- 
:irtillcr~man or an Officer of ficld battcrics (I hope my fricnds in 
tliosc branches will nndcrstaad that I do not rcfcr to thcm in any 
dcgrco to detract from tlic brilliant scrriccs which t h g  perform in 
their own sphei.o)--a horse-artilleryman or a11 Oflicer froin ficld 
batteries, I say, is often scnt to fill an important position in o 
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876 TLIE SUPREXACP OF THE XAYP 
garpison, n plncc for which Iic is xot only nnfittcd, but from wliicll 
1ic cicsircs to cscnpc as soon as possible. As n gciicrnl rulc, Oniccrs 
prcfcl* tho ficld nrmy to tlic garrison forcc, I~ccausc of tlic bclicf thnt 
thcrc is morc promotion, Iiononr, nnd rorvnrd to bc dcrircd from tllo 
forxncr tliair tlie lattcr. Clearly thc important h t n y  of tho dcfcnco 
of ilnval stations would bc provided for nioro eficiciitly if it wero 
coiiductcd by a body uiidcr thc Admiralty speci:ilIy ciilistcd rind 
traincd for tlic purpose. I cannot admit that tlic vicms I Iiavc re- 
fcrrcd to ~rould prcvcnt capable mcii from cntcring such a Scrvice. 
I may cito tlic prcscnt body of 3Iarirics as sliowing tlint thcrc would 
bc no dificulty in  obtaining tlic requircd fnrcc. For, as is wcll 
known, rccruits for thc Xarincs arc casily obtained. Estra par, 
whicli all might aspire to, \vonld bo gircn to tliosc wlio perform 
spccial dntics. just as it  113s alrcady bccn proposed io givc thc 
garrison artillcry cxtm pay. I t  is said, I know, that tlic JIarincs 
would losc tlicir charactcr as n forcc afloat by a dimiuntion of thcir 
pcriod of scrricc a t  sea. Kot to mention, lio\\-c\--cr, that thc numbcr 
of &rincs at 6c3. \ o d d ,  n i idc~  thc sjstcrn adrocatcd, be incrcascd, 
thcrc irould also bc n largo ndditionnl forco of thc corps, for tlic 
Naq- to draw upon undrr ccrhin contingencics, and these irould 
ccrtainly bc prcfcrablc to incn wlio lind ncvcr liad a nautical 
trainilrg. 
Again, it is said that tlic prcscnt sjstcm of garrisonisg onr nand 
stations is cconomicnl. ISow it cannot bc hcld thnt any sjstcm is 
ccoiiomical whicb, for onc rcason or nnoflicr, is not tho Lcst cnlcu- 
Iatcd for tlic objcct to bo nttairicd. But, irrcspcctive of any sncli 
considcrntiori, I cannot adniit that tlic schcmr! proposed u-ould bc 
niorc cspcnsivc. Supposc, for instancc, tlic principlo was stnrtcd bx 
plncing thc prcscnt garrisons of tlic naval stations undcr n a r d  
ordcrs, and that an ciniiiciit military ninn wcrc rcqucstcd for n time 
to tako command of thoso garrisons, niidcr tZlc control of tlic First 
Lord of tlic Admiralty, tlic plan might c\-idcutly bc carried out 
without e s t m  cost. If additional cspcnsc had to Lo incwrcd. owing 
to tlic adoption of an iniprovcd sptcrn, it \\-oiild bo duc to C~IISCS 
cot 'ncccssaiiIy pccuIiar to any plan, but would nrisc from circum- 
&mccs common to any organization that might ~ I C  adoptcd. On oiic 
pixit I nm siirc that grcnt cconomJ- would rcsult from tlic ndoption of 
tlic sclicmc irliicli I ndrocate, vk., that  tlic division of storcs rcccutly 
iictcrrnincd upon, and thc conscqucnt duplication of Dcpartmcnts, 
rould thcrcby bc reridcrcd nnucccss:irr. 
So far as I ham been oblc to gntbcr, thc idea h a t  it would bc 
uistly to substitute bIariues for the prcsciit garrisoiis is rnninlF 
Lnscd on tlic nssuuiption that thc sjstcm mould only bc adopted nt 
certain forcign stations, nud that it \muld bc ncccssary to providc 
additional men who would LC scnt out froin tinic to tiinc to rcliero 
tliosc nt such forcign stations ; and who would, thcrcfoi.~, spcnd half 
tltcir timc in cnforccd idlcncss. According to tlic plan snggcstcd, 
howxcr, tho additional Xarincs required for reliefs could not only 
i,'c emplojcd at  tbo'naml stations a t  hourc,but in mccting tho prcscnt 
clcIicicncj in thc Nard Rcscrres. 
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FOR IJIPERIAL DEFESCE, 877 
It lias, I nndcrstnnd, been stated that tho conscqucnt abolition of 
many men undcr thc Army Dcprtmcnt ~\-on]d ]cad to a reductioc 
in tho numbcr of rcservc troops. n’om nn Araly rcscrrc of garrison 
:,rtillcry is really not rcquircd a t  all. ,In a fcw )-caps it bccomcs lcss 
cfficicut, on-ing to thc chnngcs of matcricl, than tllc local Voluntccrs, 
,\+o arc thc real rcscrves for tllc artillcry dcfcnding our ports. It is, 
morcorci; scarcc1~- necessary to obscrvc that ns tile principle of pro- 
riding for n rcscrrc forcc might apply to tho IIaririu ~ o r c c  as wcI1 ns 
to tho Army, tlic transference of R certain number of men from on0 
branch to thc othcr cnn make no diffcrcrice. Tho rcscrvCS of tllc onc 
.might bo utilized for the othcr, providcd i t  wcrc xiccessary to do SO. 
Unt then, it is urgcd that, if wc 1i:ind O V C ~  our ~iar-n~ stations and 
coast dcfcIiccs to thc Knml Dcpnrtniciit, wc s h l l  bc crcntirig two 
nmiics. 311 answcr is, that at prcscnt (crcn apart from tIic Coloni:ll 
troops), ~ r c  h a w  tlircc armies. Tlic Nnrinc Forcc andcr tho Adiiiimltj- 
is OIIC, and wllnt popularly call tho Army forms thc otlicr tiyo, for 
thc ficld army is a scpnnto thing from tho garrison army for our 
llaval stations. A11 tlint I proposc to do, is, to place this last-men. 
tioncd forcc u d e r  tlic K a ~ a l  Ucpartnicnt, and to organize it accord. 
in$}*. 
IVhicliis bcst cnlcnlatcd to mcct thc qttncks 
of hostilc vcsscls ? Is it n mnn in tlic Army, \die lias Iind no naval 
cducntion, and who has Iiad no opportunity of p i n i n g  n kiiomlcdgc of 
tho moi-cmcnts of ships, or is it onc wlio lins bccn brought up nndcr tlic 
Xwiy, and who is conrcrsant with naval training? Tlicrc can bc no 
doubt whntcvcr--wi tlrout rcf crcncc to o tlicr ivciglit~ considcmtioiis, 
-but that tlic latter must bc inlinitely better suitcd to tlic d u t j  of 
defcnding o u r  ports and coasts than nn Army man cnn be. Tlic con- 
clusion must bo that tho forcc mhicli garrisons tho sea-dcfcnccs of our 
naval stations at homo and abroad, 11-hich is also charged u-ith tlic 
defcnec of our coasts, shonld bc under naval organization nnd should 
rcccivc a naval training. And thisapplies to Voluntccrs also, for tlierc 
can bc no doubt but that thcy would bo emploFeci miicli morc cffec- 
tunlly, for, the objcct for wliich those at tho ports and 0x1 tho coasts 
csist, i f  associatcd with thc Kwal Dcpartmcnt. Tlic seafaring class 
do not likc being turncd into soIdicrs, and tho class of mcn rcquind, 
cspeciallj- for submarine mining duties, would be better attracted by 
a Narnl Administrntion. 
A rcason givcn by somc for objecting to thc proposccd trnnsfcr is 
that, if such a plnn \l-crc carried out, tho Navnl Department would bo 
inclincd to spcxid tho money voted by Pnrlinincnt for iinrnl purposcs 
on stations nndfortifications, to thc neglcct of thc Flcct. It is difticult 
to den1 with nn nrgnment thnt is cntircly imaginary, cxccpt by saying 
that tlioso who hold suck vicws arc nltogcthcr mistnkcn ns to tho 
naturc of tho proposal. The rotcs for tho Fleet and for tlic inatdriel 
and giirrisons of thc n n d  stations ivould bc quitc distiiict. and thcrc 
would bc no poivcr, nny morc than a t  prcscnt, of espcnding tlic sum 
dcsigned for tlic onc upon tho othcr Serricc. 
A s  rcgards thc prob:ilility of obtaining tho ratcs from Parliament, 
tlicro would bc :i mucli bcttei. cliancc of tlic na\-nl statiou items being 
Consider tlic maticr. 
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S78 TIIE SUPREMAOT OF THE ShVT 
cliccrfiilly passed w11cii it was kiiowi tliat siicli cspciiditurc i v n ~  
really for nard ~iurposcs. Tho late 3Lr. Cobdcn, whcn objecting to 
what wcrc a t  tho time called I’almcrston’s fortifications, said t1i:rt lie 
\vould rotc anything for thc Nai-y, and lind hc bccn a\rnro that the 
Palmerston schcmc was IL portioii of tlic 11:~v:i1 dcfencc of thc Empircs, 
iio would doubtlcss liavc-bccxi n strong advocate of n policy which, in 
tlic absence of siinicicnt information, bc opposcd. 
With respect to tlic self-govcrning Coloiiics, of course no action 
could bo tnkcn in tlic dircction iiidicatcd, without rcfcrcucc to tilo 
scvcral Governrncnts conccrned. It might, indecd, bc argucd that, iil 
tlic casc of thcir dcfended ports, thc local Parlinmciits would bc uii- 
wiIliiig to rotc supplics for  n forcc wliich would bo undcr tlic control 
of tlic ddmirnl of thc station. M y  cspcricncc, homcvcr, lcads xi10 to 
tliiiik that thc objection is more spgcious tlinn rcd. Tlic KIL~J- 
is dcscrvcdlr popular in those countries, on its OWIL account, a5 
bcing an cviclcnce of connection with tlic motlicr-country, and if 
Colouinl politicinns oiicc realized tliat tlio g;irrisons of thcir dcfciidcd 
ports shoiild bc placcd uridcr tlie control of tlic Adin id ,  I fcel sure 
that they will bc as rcody to act througk liiiii as through any other 
Ofliccr, Imperial or local. KO doubt, i f  tlic naval stations in  tlic 
Colouics rcfcrrcd to wcrc p h c d  under na\-al control, oficcrs and inmi 
.would mostly bo clioscn from the colonists. This would bo 110 dis. 
ndvautngo to either side. 
A s  rcgards othcr Coloiiics, i t  is stntcd tliat the hdniiral Cominaiid- 
iiig 011 n station \\-auld expcriciicc diflicultics with tho scrcml 
Governors. I trust that I nni not going too far  tvhen I say that this 
objcction re?lly amounts to purc Iialluciiiation. Tho Governor would 
dcnl with his oivn dutics, and would liavc nothing to say to thc 
Admiral in timo of war, and during pcacc thc Admir:il would only act, 
:IS he dcemcd fit, a t  tlic Governor's rcqucst. Tlic Commander-in- 
Chicf, both during war and peace, would be soprcmc in all things 
rclnting to his splicrc of duty. It is tho X ~ a l  Uomm3xidcr-iii-Cliicf 
::lono on a forcign station wlio ivoulcl liavc tlic means of undcistand- 
ii:g tho situation as :L wliolc. As it is, liowcvcr, tho Gonrnor might 
t i i d  tho Kaval Corumniidcr-iii-Ciiict M i n g  him oiic thing, whilst tho 
Cfcncivl rniglit insist upon other viem. It is not too much to say 
tli:rt the pi*csexit, position is both anomalous and daugcrous. 
A question which has n vcry important bearing upon the proposnl 
wliicli I hnvc discusscrl is tlic grcat cliangc that has taken plrcc in 
tho construction of vessels composing tlic Plcct, and tho conscqucnt 
nltcratioii tliat 1i:is occurrcd, nnd must still furtlicr occiir, in tlic 
crews of oiir ships-of-was. As crcrr onc kno\vs, in ancicnt timcs, 
vcsscls uscd for warlike purposes were propellcd by oars, worked, of 
coursc, by oarsmcn, wlio werc the sailors, whcrcas the figliting part of 
tlio crew consisted of 1. in d sruen. 
The present condition of things on board R man-of-Kar is vcry 
arialogous to that which csistcd in days of yorc. Thc wsscl is pro- 
pcllcd by steam, arid for licr movements wc arc dcpcndcnt upon 
enginccrs axid stokcis, subject, of course, to tlic Oficcr in command. 
Tlic artillery of a ship-of-war may bc 1:irgcly worked by mcn not 
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FOR U1PERIA.L DEFESCE. 879 
n,cessarily of tlic nautical profcssion, and what arc dcsignatcd '' blue- 
jackets " arc perhaps less rcquircd than fornicrlJ-. 
~'Iiis ubjcct has bccn ably trcnted of by Captain Charlcs Johnstone, 
R.s., in a papcr which 110 ~ r a d  at this Institution last Fcbruarj-, & 
yropos of n proposcd re-arrnngcnicnt for matining tlic Flcct. 110 
,uggcstcd that the Jlarincs should bc incrcasd in numbcis to supiJy 
I would carry this idca furthcr arid iucirasc 
tllc Jlnrincs, not only for the immcdiatc rcquircmcnts of tlic Flcct, 
but also for tho garrisons of naval stations. 
Thc advantngc that would bc gained by carrying out this sclicmc 
soulcl not only bc that thc immediate wants of thc Blcct wonld bc 
supplied, but that tlic Admiral on m y  station would, as 1 haw bcforc 
pointed out, bc cnabled to eschangc mcn on sliorc for tliosc afloat, as 
desired ; or might, undcr conditions in wliicli, in his opinion, it ivould bc 
unncccssal*y to maintain n full garrison a t  m y  particuIar placc, utilizc 
portion of tho mcn on shore for scri-icc in aclditioual ships. 
It is, I know, objcctcd tliat, though pcrhaps, i f  wc wcrc to start 
afresh, wc might adopt tlic proposal, tlic changc in our sjstcm n-ould 
b3 too p e a t  if it went carried out now. But this is tantamount to 
sn+g tliat, whatcvcr may bc thc objcctions to tlic prcsciit systcxn, no 
scherrio is admissiblc for rectifying tlicm. This, howcvci., is o sort of 
reasoning that is put forward npinst  an-y rcforru wliatcvcr, and ccr- 
hinly could havc no w i g h t  with thosc who regmd thc prcscnt con- 
dition of affairs rclating to tho organization of the Army and Navy 
Departments as " unsatisfacto1.y and dangcrous." 
Xor is this plan D nciv one, for, 80 far back as tlic year 1818, Lord 
St. Vincciit proposed it. Thcrc is no rcason \diy a Knml Officcr 
sliall not hayo undcr him thc garrisons of his stations thaii tlicrc is for 
his having the comniand of tlio crew of a ship-of-war. Tcchnical 
military drill on slioro would naturally bc conducted by the Officcrs of 
tlie Jfarins forces, and rcry possibly tho garrison itself would bc corn- 
irianded by a Xariuc Officcr ; but tho whole naval station, including 
tlic Uarincs on sliorc, would, subjcct of coursc to tliu Admiralty, bc 
iindcr the suprcmc dircction of tho Admiral. Kclson himsclf, bc it 
rcmcmlcred, I T ~ S  a Colonel of Marines; Lord 1Iowc was also P 
Colonel of the samc corps ; and any onc may scc, in tho dining-i-ooni 
of thc Uuitcd Scrvicc Club, a pictnrc of Admiral Sir Gcorgc Cock- 
burn, 01.10 of tlic bcst Karal Lords of thc Admimltj-, drcsscd in nard 
uniform with Uessian boots and spurs ! 
Of coursc, tlic adoption of tho schcmc would ncccssarilj- bo attended 
with a considcrablo reduction of tho Army, and thrcforo it would bc 
unpopular, at all crcnts with that force. No onc can rcgrct this mole 
than I do, for the grcatcr part of my life has bcen spcnt in tlic Army, 
and I am proud both of tho chicfs undcr whom, and of tlic comrades 
with wliom, I havo served. Thc cnorulons advantage, howcver, that 
could Lo dcrired, to a y  mind, ontwcighs all otlicr considcrations. 
From whatcvcr point of view tlic matter bc rcgardcd, unquestionably 
tho tiansfcr would bo D great public bcncfit. I entreat cvcry one con- 
ccrncd to lm ready to lay a d o  all prcconceived opinions and their 
most cherishcd ideas, if iiecd bc, for thc gocd of tlie country. We 
reduction of seamcn. 
. 
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880 TIIE SUI’REJIACY OF THE NAVY 
can nevcr expect that our  Army can Tic Kith the armed hosts 04 
otbcr Europcaii nations. 
Hemember wlin t  tho Great Napoleon said to O’lIcara at St. Helcnn, 
d i c n  hc could haw had no motivc whatever in advancing anything 
on thc subject but the naked truth. “Your soldicrs. arc bravc; 
nobody can dcny it; but it  was bad policy to cncouragc tho military 
mania instead of sticking to your marine, which is tho real force of 
Sour country, and onc which, if IOU prcscrrc it, will n l w q s  rcndcp 
you powcrful.” When Kapolcon said this, the inequality of the 
Continental Armies wlrcn compared with tlioso of this country w a g  
. infinitcly less t h a n  it is now, and so thesc words lrnvc all thc grcatc; 
force in thc prcscnt day. 
I may add that tho following was written by that great statcsuian, 
Edmund Burke, to Admiral Kcppcl : I a m  pxfectlr convincccl that 
‘ l3:nglishmen and s c a m c n  are names which must live aud die 
togcthcr.” 
Will not Great Britain bo wiscr if s h o  directs licr cncrgies to main. 
tain and strengthen her position as tlic grcat naval Power of the 
world ? 
Admiral Sir It. T. I~AXILTOS. K.C.B. : Thi3 p p c r  i3 licadcd “Tho Suprcmicy 
of tlic hnyy for Inipcrid Dcfcncc.” \‘i’hcii I fir& rcarl tlic titlc I thought wc wcre 
to  li3rr eouictliing new, but I find in rcality i t  is only tlic lcctiircr’a prcrious r n a p  
zinc articlc “IIornc Rulc far tlic X~TX, ’~  in wliicli it is stated at the conclusion, 
until tlic Xarr lias obtaincd thc command of tho eca, the Army cannot lcire 
Great Britain, which in my o inion ritiatcs his ~vholc nrgiimcnt, a3 under t l ics 
circumFtanccs, ~ i o a  can t ~ i a t  f r m r  b~ bcttcr crnp1qcd tlian in protccting naral 
bascs, thercbj rcttinn thc XOTJ. frco for its proper duty on our “occan higl~wjs .”?  
Ny objcction to  tlzs eclicmo is that i t  is rcrolution, not reform, arid I think 
crcry statesman dislikes tlic idea of rcrolution most complctcly, whether in n State 
or of a dcpartmcnt. Thi3 echcmo i3 to turn rnilors into soldiers, and I object to  that. 
Whether, by-and-by, it will also be to turn Eoldicrs into sailors I cannot q, but i t  
somcahat rcminds mo of an incident in my carccr in Ireland somc right or tCn 
ycnrs ago, wlicn tho Saq-  was emplojcd in earrjing troo 3. Therc mns ono mngis- 
trato who did not get on wry  \sell wit11 tho troops, anlnpplicd for n gunboat .to 
bc placed a t  his disposal, 11311 of the crew to be cmplored Escorting him on oriction 
dujy. It R ~ S  rcferred to me, nnd my answer was, u Wben 31r. So-and-so is prcpnrcd 
to take command of tho gunboat and go to  sea m t h  a crow of Irish Con- 
stabulary, then I om prcpnrcd to lend my nicn to do soldiers’ and police 
work incficicntly, nnd by d e ~ t r o ~ i n g  tlic gunboat’s power of mobility, Icwn 
its raluc malcrinlly.” I Earc o r c r ~  grcat idco of lenthcr, nnd cjpccially na rd  
Icatlicr ; at tlic same timc lct crcqbod stick to his Inst: my last i3 on tho sca, tlie 
roldicrs’ last is on thc shorc. - To usc t i c  prord~ of Sir Waltcr Raleigh, England k 
a country that can ncrcr bo conqucrcdahilc the kings tlwrcof Iiwc dominion of the 
pca. h’or, is i t  tkc right way to obtain tho command of the SCB to shut up our 
eailors in our liomc dcfenccs? I sa j ,  So .  Thc lccturcr points out that Gcrmrny 
and Frnncc nrc militnrj nations, th3t they harc cxtcosirc hnd frontiers, arid main- 
tain enormous armics, but ncrertlieless the3 entruet tlic dcfeccc of their liarbours 
and conets to the Xma1 Dcpartmcnt. Tlio lecturcr lm certainly missed thc paid 
here. GcrmnnrandFnncc ero hug0 first-class mili ta~countrics that think it is of 
tho utmost conrcqucncc that ercrr  eoldicr should bo on tho fronticr, and tl@ 
army first on tho frontier inradcs tho cnenij’a country. In tho luat France  
Qcrman war tlic cry  as “To hris,” c“l?o Berlin.” The Gcrlnans wcrc quiclicet 
in their organization, and they got to Paris; liad tho French been quiclicet, 
it might limo becn tlic otlrcr way. Tlrercforc it i3 obrions that it is to tlic self- 
intcrczt of France and CSeruany to  entrust tlicir coast dcfencc to tlic Xary, for the 
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FOR I.\IPERIAL DEFESCE. 881 
simple reason that  Ctcrmnny kould linrc but  littlc work for its Sarp, and F n n c c  
not morc, in tho c n n t  of nnotlicr wnr bc twci i  thoso l’owcrs; tlicrcforc 
t,hc anry protrcting n a r d  ports rcts thc A m p  frcc. B u t  mhnt  is tllc 
r&c with i i ~ ?  On tho outbrcat of wur wc wniit crcry rcnuian on ullr 
frontier. JVlicrc is t h t  fronticr? . S o t  I’ortsmontli, not l’lynioiitli, not 
Sllccrncss: i t  is tllc .cncniy’s co:utlinc, wliocrcr tliat ciicnrp niny bc. T11at \To9 
t.llc fronticr in tlic gooil old timcs, nnd I trust that i t  will bc tlic froiiticr-to U I ~  tlic 
*ordj of Jlickcns-in thc  good old times that  arc  to comc. I n  tlic CriNCari Jrar ,  
H.bicli ia our  Inst p a t  wir,  wlicrc wcrc our flccts ? Tlicp wcrc riot cmploycd ill 
boluc dcfcncc; onc of thciii wns in thc Baltic, tlic othcr in  tlic Bkck Era. Anybotly 
w ~ l o  rcxls tliomeinoirs of Sir Charlcs~Xnpicr can zcc what his ortlcrj wcrc: ho \y:lT 
to Gut to  tlic front as quicllp ns possible undshiitin tlicRuseiana. €0 that not onc of 
tllclr ships Could gct ou t ;  to tnkc spccid car0 that  t h y  wcrc not to gct oiit bchiiitl 
his back nnd c ~ n i c  d o a n  on our comuicrcc nnd coast; but  not ono word of Oiir 
X ~ F J -  dcfcndin: tlic lionic ports. I karc liar1 tlic adrantago a t  the Adminlty of 
rr.sding tlic orrlcra gircn to Arlmkds 100 and 200 JCEII “60, ant1 tlic biinlcn of 
t ] los  ordcrs wns, “Ycck out ;your cnciiiy ; sink, burn, nnd rlcstroy liini.” JIOW arc  
in our  port3, or it’ our scamcn ant1 
luarincs nrc cniplo~cd iii doing solllicr~’ wort? Tlic lccturcr sa~s ,  “Tkc Arinj  of 
>:~~glnnd, be i t  obscrvcd, docs not ncccssarily come into 1 h - j  for tlic dcfcncc of thc 
uiiitcd Kingdom, ciccpt on the 6uppositioii tlint our  Xarj has bccii dcfcatcd o r  
out-manmurrcd, or  tknt, orring to tlic ine~ificicncy and nkrciicc of good arnngcnicnt 
of our coast dcfcnccs, thc  countrJ- itsclf lias bccomc tlic sccnc of niilitary opcmtions. 
But  why nrc wc to  ncglcct nll tlic tcacliings of liistorj? Wlicn wcrc our flcctr out- 
mnnmurrcd and dcfcatcd? I should lilic thc gallant lccturrr to ansncr nic that  
qucjtion. Our  military brctlircn h r p  vcry 
milch upon tlicec eubjccts. Tlicir first cnso is tho nsccnt cf tlic lIcdway. by the 
Dutch; the rcsult I T ~ B  that  tlicp lost trro men-of-war, nnd ciglit firc-ships, d o t r o j -  
in:: six nicn-of-aar and clcFen of our firc-ships, nlao taking Slicerncs~. I n  thc  
Tknmes tlicy urccndcd to Long ITopc, did no daningc czccpt friglitcning London, 
nnd twrc twicc driven out  of it. B u t  whilc t h y  wcrc doing this rlnmngc wc wcrc 
cutting OT tlicir t n d c  to tlic cztcnt of niillions in tlic Xorth Sca, 60 that  on thc  
aliolc thc  balnucc of ndrniitngc H-us dccidcdly in our favoiir. Anotlicr f i~roar i tc  
imtancc is that  aftcr tlic Uattlc of DC~cliy I Icx l  for two j c x s  tlic Frcncli had 
pescrsion of thc ECU. JVIiat. thc  fnct? D C ~ C ~ J  Ucad waa fought on tlic 13th 
Junc, 1C90, but  tlic Frcncli could not follow i t  up by any oEciisirc opcr~t ions 
bccausc tlic English Flcr t  was on tlicir flank, rmdy to  conic doan upon tlicm. 
Thcr had not an urxnj r c d j ,  and t h o  flcet could do nothing by iticlf ; it rcquircd 
thc co-opcntion of nn nrmy: ‘Jul Y e t .  Sir C. Shorcl sailcd frow r l j m o u t h  to 
bland with troops nnd Etorcs, n n 3  our communications with tha t  country wcrc 
ncvcr intcrruptcd, and Iic protcctcd our tr.idc. Tkc  Frcncli wcrc last wen off our 
corwt on August 5th, whcn thcy mcnt into wintcr qunrlcrs, haring only burnt Tcign- 
moulli. Thcn \ rc lx~rc  tho casc d i c n  tlic Spnnislirmd thc Frcncli E’lrcts iinited ngainst 
thc Englkh Flcct in  1782, but what linppcncd thcn t Tho French had no lrrniy to 
wnd owr, and tlic consequcnce R ~ S  tlint sclicmo frll to nothing nt 311, for tlic siniplr 
reason that  tho combincd flccts could noL tntc  nny offcnsiro opcrations with a 
Britirh Flcct on their flank rcndy to attnct them, nor did they c w r  practically coiu- 
mnnd tho Channcl. Therefore, why sliould our militsry friends a l G a ~ s  giro UII crcilit 
for being out-mnnccuvred ? Uut supposing the cncm is ablc to Inntl, is Iic going to 
knock his licad ngainst tlicsa rtonc forts ? KO; if Ec lnndj Iic will comc alicrc 
there are no fortifications. I t  rcminds mc of a Cliine.;c storr, in which wo wcro 
going to storm onc of tlicir forts, which liad an C ~ J -  gradient iip to it, nnd tho 
Cliincre a c r e  waiting nt tlic top. Thcro RUS nleo a stccp direct nppronch, and 
our  men toot  that  way whcrc they wcro not prepnrcd, ant1 tEc Chincsc said tlicy 
did not figlit fair. NOH-, the fnct is that  our  focs do not nlnsjs fight fair in thnt 
wnsc, and instcnd of knocking their licndr a t  Spi t l icd tlicrc is no doub~ tha t  t h y  
would comc whcrc tlicy a n  land casicst,if tlic Flect were nou est. Thclrcturcr i t rcry 
complimcntnrp to  thc Xarj. I Ic  has alludctl to Sir Williaru l I c a c t t  up tho Xigcr 
in  16i l ino t l r ing  to  do with militnry opcntions nt nl l -~~ud  Irc has rlso dliidcd to 
thc  opcmtions of Admiral Sir Edniund 1;rcmmtlc at JVitu, which wcrc of a moro 
to scrk out  our cnclny if R C  aro 611ut u 
I am not nwarc of tlic circumstancc. 
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ss2 THE SUPREJIAOT OF TIIE XAVT 
military,naturc ; but I do not supposc that  Admiral Frcmantlc supposcs that Ire 
could orpirim nn cxpcdition to 3lngdnlo, for that is n military operation nnd re. 
quires military knonlcdgc. Tlic lccturcr sny3, “ Many cmincnt nuthoritics sa that 
tlic Xaval lkpartmcnt cannot undertake tlic incrcascd rccsponsibility involved? os 
that point I perfectly ugrce, nnd I will rend tlic aords of IL mail wrhom crcvbodp 
rcspccts, \rliosc opinion is of the highcat d u e ,  t l u t  is, tlic Iatc Sir Coopcr Iicy, ~ 1 1 0  
was for firc year3 Lord of tho Admiralty, niid was o man of great adniinistratire 
capacity and cqcricrcc. He sap, “It is gr.itifjing to kuow that if wc wcrc at 
war with limncc, Gcrmany, or Russia wc might reby on a largc portion of tlic best 
Officcrs and ecniiicn of tlic cncing’s navy bting unavailnblc for ECS scmicc. (%).It 
i3 quitc natural that a country without o ponerfiil nary ~hould turn hcr nttcntion 
to tlie dcfcnccs of her . lIcncc tho nnxicty nud carcful organization of 
acriiianyon that iiea(1. (ports 3)  I dcprcaitc throwing tho rcspousibility of thcdcfcncc 
of oiir p r t s  on thc Xnvj. I bclicrc i t  would prow tlic ruiu of our Xarj. I see 
no i1ilTiculty in nha t  is cnllcd a divided responsibility for tho defcncc of our ports. 
JIuny operations of latc pears 1imc bccn ciitrustcd to ;r Sara1 unil Military force, 
and 110 want of iinity of octicn has bccn appurcnt. Tho War Ucpnrtmcnt arc 
re~ponsiblc for tlic fircd’dthncc; the Xary for tho niobilc.” Evcrjono of 
11s will cordially asscut to t h t .  l hc rc  113s been no -ant of Iiaponious 
co-opcration bctnccn thc Army and tlic Xary in tllc past. Tlicrc IS n rerj- 
csccllent book which I liaro read, on tho question of tlic military forces of the 
Statc, which points out that in tlic year 1859 the consolidstion of thc Sccrctnv of 
War, tLc Coiiiniandcr-in.CliicE, tlic Board of Ordnancc, niid so on, has not 
rcsultcd well. I think cvcrybody will admit that is tlic casc, and instead of 
draii tagc hnriiig bcen dcrircd from that changc, it r a s  quitc tho contrary. Grcnt 
administrators 11ai-o raid that when n dcpartinent become3 Eo large that tlic rc- 
spoirsiblc licacl docs not know thc working dctnilz, i t  is too large. A t  this moment 
the First Lord knows crcrjthing of importancc that ie going on a t  tlic Adnii- 
ralty, and E ~ C S  crcry letter goinn to other Dcpartiiicnts esccpt on purcly routine 
inattcrs. s o w  I haw nlrcndy AI that wc should nlnqs takc t l ic offcxsiw m d  
not tlic dcfcnsirc. In tlic latter part or’ tlic .lecture thc lecturer alludes to 
d i a t  Xnpoleon said of our orniics. I think Iic had rcry good reason to SUJ 
so. It would har!: bccn an iincommon?)’ good thing for him if HC hnd d a ~ y s  
concentrated our ivholc nttcntion to the Xnry and neglcctcd tho Army. LToacrtr, 
to wind up, I would sq- I bclicrc that this subject is cntircly out of the rangc of 
practied narnl politics. Anotlicr thing I would fay is that our politicians on 
both si:lc3 of tho IIouso ~ a y  that  our h’nry eliould be raised to a point equal to  thnt 
of nriy two nariea in thc.world, and when thcy liarc attained that position it \rill 
then bc plenty of tiiiic to introduce novelties. 
Ficld.MnrslinI Sir .J. LISIOIW SIXMOSS, G.C.D. : As Sir Tcscy Hamilton haa 
stated, this is not n reform thati9 proposed, bu ta  rcrolutionin the now1 and milihrj  
iorccs of thc country. I d& not proposc to go into mnnj of tho details nlluded 
to  in this papcr; I may ray, howcrcr, that  I agrco entircly with tho prcnmblc, 
which contains just  83 sound nu nrgumcnt for retaining things ns thcy are 
as for chinning them. I h t  thcrc ia  onc point in it to wliicli I wish to 
zdliidr, in w k h  tlic m-riter talks of dcfcn&,n baics. IIc puts i t  in t h b  way: 
“Fancy the casc of tlic Commander of nn nrmy in tlic field who practically could 
not scud an ordcr to liis base.” Tliat would bc a lamcntablc po3ition; but tlicrc 
is very littlo analogy between tlic bnsc of nil army in the field axid tho bas0 of Her 
3Injcstg’s Fleet opcnting nt sea. ’ I n  thc case of tho nnny in tlic iiclii tho General 
in conininnd corers his own base. 1fc protects i t  himself, and if lic i3 cut off from 
t11at basc, as thc French wcrc by tho Gcnunns in 16iO before tho catnstrophc of 
Scdan, tlic wliolc war is Likely to conic to 1111 end. On thc contrary, the Nary l i ~  
b ~ r s  nl l round thc  consts. I f  nn Admiral in conimnnd of D squndron-I nm speak- 
ing iu tIic prescncc of naval Oniccrs, who’ crhnpa ail1 correct mc if I nxn wrong- 
wcrc acting on tlic high sca8 not far from ticcoast of Irclond,for imtnncc, IpreOUme 
hc might tnkc liisships into Cork to  replenish. Cork, thcrcforc, for that pnrticular 
occnsion would bo his bnsc. . lIow would it bc if hc 1iad thc conimnnd of tho wliolu 
of thc bnscs of the kingdoin? If  YOU girc him tlic comrnand of Portsmouth it 
might not girc bini tIic command of ‘Cork. Thcrcforc, if go11 cstcnd your sptenr 
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FOR IJIPERIAL DEFESCE. 883 
.Illcl carry it out tlioroughly, you must phcc tho same nard Officcr in conimnn(1 of 
, l l  tilc buses from which t h C  llccts ciin rcqiiiro support. 'X\-Y objcct of tlic autllorv.r 
,,lpcr is suniiivirizcd in t l l ~  following srntcncc : " I submit that this fuiictionJ'- 
f l L c  of nard stations--"i3 on0 tliat sliould bc undcrtal.cn b~ forcp3 
llndcr tlio Ward Dcpnrtnicnt, nncl tlint tllc s w  g:irriaons of ~iaral stations a t  home, 
lls well aa tlio dcfencc of our sliorcs at lioinc, sliould also be cntrugtcd to tllat 
I)c.lLnrt~icnt.'J ' XOW I (10 not know Wliat u sea garrison is as tipart from tho laud 
nnrrieo~i. It puzzlc3 m ~ ,  for I really do not understand it, unlco~ it means 
If 
I look a t  tlic Report of tlic Cominirsion of d i i ch  Sir Trilliaiu Jcrvoia was Sccrctory 
in 1~39, nnd I ruust saj  i t  is due to him in grcnt nic:isurc that tbc rc~onimcndation3 
of tllnt Rcport wcre carried out, with a Skill that has won for him the reputation of 
being onc of the Grjt iililitnry engineers in Europe-if I look n t  that Rcport I fillcl 
tllnt thc garrison neccsaary for l'ortsmoutl~ nntl thc Islc of Wight is 20,~1i)o; for 
plTmoutL, IG,rXX) ; Ycnibrokc, 7.000 ;'Portland, 3,000; tho Tl~aincs, JkdlvaJJ 2nd 
&(linin, 13,000 : T&daicIi, 3,500 ; and wc inny ns v-cII includc tlic garrison : l ~  
\\-ooltrich in tliat of the Thaines uxid tlic 3Iedwaj, bccausc tlic fortilications of tllc 
( T ~ ~ ~ I I I C S  a ~ i d  tlic Mcdway hrrc ncrcr been complctcd; Dorcr, 6,000; Cork, p,Soo; 
,n:lking a total at honic of 63,000. XOK 1 maintain that that Rcport, which was 
written in 1860, in no clcgrcc csaggcratc~ tho girrisons rcquircd for thcsc 
tllc ereiit of war against a poircrfitl xnnritimc nation. Tlicrcforc you iz:'," f:: 
I)rovidc in tho crcnt of war GS,000 mcn for t h c ~  ports. IYhat lrirc 1rc nbrond ? 
\VC 1i:rrc a nuxnbcr of stations, wliic1i:irc xictually garrisoncd a t  tho present t h c  by 
?;,000men, nnd I belicrc if brought up to  tlicir war strength, including thc garrisons 
of boaling  tati ions gbrond, exclusirc of colonial troop, ahicli liar0 to nsrizt ycrr 
],irgcly in thc dcfcncc, tlic total forcc required would bc 35,000. Thcrcforcjou liarc 
to put under this Xnrd 1)epnrtnicrit a military forcc of 103,000 rncn. That i3 
mtbcr a largo order; nnd thcn, if. gou look into thc constitution of this forcc, tlic 
t.liing bcconics uttcrly impossiblc, un lcs~  irc Iinre o sjstcm of conscription, and u 
~~incli  lnrger Army and pcrsonncl of tho Xnry than wo h a w  a t  prtscnt. Tho 
Sctual forces of .thc lhq i r e ,  tnlicii from thc latcst Rctiirns a t  iny ~l~sposnl, 3rc n j  
follows-and I mnr stntc I linro no ncce53 to nnj- onicial reports tbnt arc not open 
to  tlie nliolc world; I 1iavc not bccn in communication with tlic IIorso Guard3 or 
Wnr 1)cpartnicnt oil tlic subjcct, and thc facts that I rtatc arc takcii from thclatcst 
publislicd Rcturns-wc h:irc D forcc a t  lionic of 103,936; in tlic Colonies, 
2i,147; in Xgjpt, 4,135 ;. in Indin, 72,999 ; that is to s a ~ ,  abroad, IO-l,?Sl rncn. 
In  otlicr words, tlic Stnnhng Anuy i3 nbout cqunlly dividcd into two portioua at 
liomc nnd abroad. \Vc L ~ V C  lfcsemes, 66,165; 3Iilitia I h c r r c s  wliicli nrc 
;imilablc for tlic Army, 30,161, which briug up the tot31 militarj- forcc that 
would bc available in tlic casc of war in tlic shape of u Standing Army both at  
liomc wd nbrond to 20G,GG3. Of tliat forcc X92,2S2 would bo a t  lionic; but, in 
tlic crent of anr, a large portion of tLi3 forcc would bc cletdcd, I liarc not 
the sliglitcst doubt, to form &my Coq)~, for opcrcitions in tho ficld, nnd rcally 
niid truly tho garrisons of tlicec fortrcsseee a t  liolnc would lo nindc up to a Iargc 
rrtcnt of rccraits, of Volunteers niid of Xilitin; and I harc no doubt that 
sonic of tho most important girrisons nbrond would, 3s in the cn3e of the 
Crimcan War, be prrisoned by Ililitin. Therefore, you would liarc in carrying 
out this principlc, in tryiug to  find 100,000 inen to pl:icc under tlic Fist Lord of 
tlic ddmiralty, u. great clifliculty in dctcrmioing what t l i g  shoultl be. Arc gou 
going to tnkc EO mnny Regulars, bo nmni Voluntccrs, so many 3lilitia rcgimcnt.s? 
110s arc sou t o  manage i t ?  A t  ~)rcecnt lic detail for any scrricc nbroad is 
uianagcd with rcfcrcncc to  tlic condition3 of rnrioua rcgimcnts n t  l i m n  and abroad. 
F o r  inrtancc, as hnppcncd in tlic Egyptinn campnign, tkc garrisons in tho Mcdi- 
tcmncan wcrc rcnt nnnr to tlic En&, and, if. neccssrj, no doubt their plmcca 
voiiltl Iiarc been fillcd br Uilitin, as was donc during tho Crinicaii War. That is 
thc sistcm. Thercforc, if you are to Iiave tlic garrijons under tho Xnral Dcpnrt- 
mcnt, JOU must mako some rrnngcnicut to mcct a contingency of this sort, which 
would, I think, placo tlic nard and militarr authorities in a niorc difficult position 
thnn they nrc undcr prcscnt circuiiistnncci. It. is uttcrlj impossible. I commnndcti 
in a tiamnl fortress for four or firs years, and I must say I ncvcr had nny clitii- 
~ ~ n l  comiiiand, u proposal tlic possibilitr of which I cannot couccirr. 
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8S4 THE SUPREJLWY OF THE NAVY 
culty whatcrer =Fit11 tho Royal KnTy in nny arrangements for thc dcfcncc of the 
place. I drcw up n Echenic for thc drfcncc; I siibmittcd i t  to thc AclrniyJl oc 
thc station, ns was my duty. 110 mndo his obsecrrstions, nnd I sent tlicm horn, 
I bclicro that E C ~ C U I C  has bccn considercd both by thc Sarnl and 3Iilit:iry Dcpan 
incnts n t  Iiomc. I think procccdings such ns that tcnd to securc action of tbD 
]nost friendly naturo bctwcen tlio autlioritics of tho Army nnd Knry in station. 
nbroad. Wcll, tlien I nsk myself this: looking nt thc qucstion in tlic interest, 
of tho Kary; I prcsumc nny Comninnder in tlic Mcditcrmncau xoiild like 
to go and incct the enemy with liis fleet; lic would lcnrc his base, irkicli JLaltn j, 
undoubtcdly iii tlic AIeditcrrancan, nnd hc \roulcl liopc on his return to find it 
perfcctly palo and sound, with nll tho nppliauccs tlicrc that hs left for the 
re-equipmcnt of his flcct, for its rc-rictualnicnt, for tlic provision of nmmunition 
nncl EO on. If 110 l i d  had i t  on his mind that Iic was rcsponsiblc for thcir safet; 
I tliink such a rcsponsibilitr yould hare bccn a burden, which rcry few men wonii 
like to  brar; nnd, tliercforc, I tliink it would bc a wrong thing, and a rash thin- 
for Iiim to undertake. But tlicn comcc, w ~ i a t  ia thc substitute? Iiistrnd s 
learing a i iditsry Officer who had studicd tho subjcct, hc would 1 1 3 ~ 0  to Ifarc a 
nard Officcr, or a marine Officcr s k o  had nlso studicd thc subjcct, with Iiin 
garrison of 12,OOO. men; nnd lct mc this 12,000 mcn nrc iiot ncccsary to 
kccp drips naay, but thcy  nrc neccssary to  clefcnd tlic position, and less than 
12,000 nicn arc not suficicnt for that purrosc in casc of war; nnd it rroiild 
rcqiiiro all tlic energies of any man rho had cliarge of tlic dcfcncc to uae 
12,C00 incn in sucli a way tlint tlicy sliould prcrcrit tlic cnclny under certain con- 
ditions from entering thc fortress of Multa. I do not suppoec that o llostilc nect 
\roulcl coinc to Malta if thc British Fleet wcrc in forcc in tlic lMcditcrnncm; 
but circumstnnccs may d n w  tlic Uritidi Flcct out of tho Ncditcrrancan, and 
then the npp~iances of steam nrc so certain, and thc nuinber of stcaiu ships, not 
ships of war, PO grcat, tliit  i t  woiiltl bc possiblc to attempt a scrioiis attnc!i on 
tho islnnd crcn vithout bcing supported by eliips of wir. Undcr thosc circuin- 
stances I think the dcfcnco of aInltr would depend upon a land iiglit, and ns 
Sir T c s c ~  Iiniiiilton said, I think, if you nrc going to put nard Olliccrs in coainntd 
of soldiers for n land fight, you had bstter put landsmen in corninand of a flcct for 
n sea fight. I think onc i3 about ns wrong as tbc otlicr. Therc is one obscnntion 
to which I must tnlic cxccption, and I tako it Sroin iiix crpcricnce, which i3 con- 
siderable on that subjcct. I tliink it t o n l j  just to tlic Rayal Rcgimcnt of Artillery 
to stato what I am going to state, nnd especially nt tlic present timc, d i e n  tlicrc ia 
a good dcal of talk of breaking it up into diffcrcnt bniichcs. Sir William Jcrrois 
writes: “ A t  present it is n great clisndrnnta c to tho garrison scrricc on n n a r d  
slation that i t  is intcrchangcablc with f l e d  duty. A Ilorsc-artillcrpnn or an 
O5ccr of Ficld Batteries ( I  hopc my friends in tlioso branclics will understand that 
I do l o  not rcfcr to tliem in any dcgrce to detroct from tlic brilliant scrricrs wliich 
tlicy perform in tlicir o m  epherc)--R Iiorsc-artillcrpan or an Oflicer from Ficld 
Batteries, I enj, i 3  oftcn sent to fill nn important position in 3 garrison, 3 plwe far 
aliicli 110 is not only unEttcd, but from which Iio dcsires to cscnpo as soon ud 
poseiblc.” Kor I must 639 this, that during my period of commnnd nt. Xdto I had 
scrcnl, many I may sny, Officers from the Roynl IIorso Artillery nnd from thc 
Unttcries who wcrc changcd by the forcc of circuinstancrs and bccamc Garrison 
gunners. They took up tlieir duties remarkably well, and they wcrc as good 
Unrrison gunneys as m y  in tlic fortress. Bfnny of them xcro supcrior to inen who 
l i d  bccn a t  their garrisou dutic, nll tlieir lircs. Thcrc is no doubt., tying o nian 
doan  to n particular duty E U C ~  as ga~rison ,work ia prcjudicial, nnd I bclicrc it 
would bc found prcjudicial if the rcrolution pro o=cd by tlic Iccturcr wcrc urried 
into effcct., if a 1nrge body of 3Inrines x e r o  toyd-off for garrison duty and list\ 
littlo or no h o p  of nny change. Therefore I think tlierc is great ndmntagc, 
and r e r j  p u t  adranta c, in rncn bcing somctimcs cmplojcd in gnrrisonc, and 
nt other times bcing cmpfoycd in thc field. I tliink it is o grcnt advnntage, and I 
thought it my duty, aftcr 6ucli nn nttack upon t h o  Royal IIorse nnd Field Artillery 
to  stato plainly my experience of thc command I htld for scrcral jenrs in Malta. 
WcU, then, na to  cconomy. “Economy” is tlic nbominablo word wliicli nicets us at 
crcry turn. If tkurc is nny propod  to incrmsc clllcicncr, i t  is nrkcd, “JYlint doc3 
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Tlicrc i3 nhrars 3 dificiilf\- about cnrrying i t  out if i t  costs moncj, 
krEctfli~ t h t  ccononiy rind cficicncy alwnys go 1i:ii1~1 i i i  ~iaiitl. Tlicrc i3 nothing 
vlorc tpkin:: iii n p p c r  of tlik Sort than to say it will bc productivc of ccononiy. 
J .take it n3 n fact that tllc gnrrisoiis, ns calciilntcd, nrc not one iiiaii too 
>,,.,,nSi I t  matters uot wlicflicr poll  illp ploy mcn nuti cdl  tlicm sailor*, orniarincs,or 
tl1cni soldiers-it iiinttCr3 not what t h y  arc-tho sainc nunibprof men cost tlio 
3.,lle a~llouiit of inoncy ; niid tlicreforc 1 think i t  is nn absurdity to  talk nbout 
~ e o l ~ o l i ~ ~  mi cso 1-011 can ~ 1 1 0 ~  t l n t  by n Change of thi3 sort you can rcducc tlic 
nu,llbcr of nien ~ l i o  nrc necessary for dcfcncc. It i3 D w r y  catcliing pr0ini.c. bl1t 
it is one irliicli is totally clcroid of niip foiindatioii. Supposing, ns suggcjtccl by 
\rilliani Jcrvois, “ a  iiiilitary nian were rcqucstcd to takc conininnd of t1le-u 
prridol~s under tlic control of tlic First Lord of tho :ldniiralty ;Ir of coursc tliat 
,llcan3 that tlic Sccrctary of Statc for Wnr is to Imnd orer lhc Qcner.\l und 
Gorfnior of Malta to thc First Lord of tlic Adniinlty. Tlicn ~ v l ~ a t  ~rould bc llis 
*,*ition ns rcg:irds tlic Adminl coliinianding thc JIcditcrrancan station ? I tlriuli 
it ro,lld bc just n3 troublcsonic, if not ~iiucli iiorc EO, t1i:in hi3 prcscnt iiidcpcn- 
,lAlf position nlongsidc of thc n a r d  Comniandcr-in-Chicf of tlic station, and 111ncll 
ll:or~ diGcult, and iniich niorc liliely to 1cad tOcontcstS. 1 think tlic wholc papcr is 
sll unfortiinatc one, bccauso it raiscs qiicstions liliclj to E C ~  thc Ariny and i\ary a t  
log~crIicad~, as was E I I O ~ U  b Sir Tcscy Ikinilton ~vlicn Iic said that, tho ArIuy 
wolllcl not girc u wliat t l icj  L a  carncd, vliilst thc ~ n r y  wcrc to try and IiiaiL- 
t.iili \ d i n t  t h y  %ad carncd; no doubt such niotircs of aclioii arc calculated to 
,,ro(llicc dificultics. IInring said so mucli, tlicrc arc n griut many points ouc C O U I ~ ~  
g3 illto, but it i3 impoesiblc to speak upon t h n i  in tlic coursc of tcii miuutcs, ap(1 
;Iftcr R papcr lias bccn so rrcll and cnrcfully considcrccl, i t  rcqiiirc3 rcry carefill 
c,nsicIention bcforc onc can nicct all tlic points. . I tliink tiic last point in tllc 
p p c r  is iinfortnnatc. 1 can pcrfcctly undcrstnlld tllc E.lJing Of Xapolcoq. bccaul 
if thc Army l i d  not csiitcd lic iroiild not Iiavc bccn whcrc hc was. 
xtdiiiird Sir QEORGE TRIOS, 1LC.U.: Tlic fcw word:, I p r o p 0 4  to prcscnt to 
tllc cont.idcmlion of tliia incctinm liarc already bccn crprcsrcd so rcry niucli bcttcr 
tllnn I coiild do by Sir Lintorn Skmons, that d l  I nccd say is that I cntircly conciir 
with cwry word tlint hc h33 enid. Still I cannot but think that, a3 n great soldicr, 
llc llns somewhat unc1,wcstiuiatcd our Iccturcr. Our lecturer Iias liad n uniquc 
cspcricncc nt. tlic IVnr 05cc  atid in l+ positions a t  homo ; 110 liaa nlso 1iad grcat 
eqwricnco in thc nffairs of thc world iu tlic Straits Scttlcnicnt3, nntl in Australia as 
3 uorcrnor, post3 in nliicli I Iiarc l i id  tlic lionour of workiiiq and pulling with Iiiui 
wit l i  thc grvatcrt Lnrmoiij. I cannot but tliink from that, tint IN Iina put fornard 
t~ i i r  papcr nicrcly as tlic outwork of tlio position that IIC is Ivcparcd to maintain in 
argiiiiielit to m s k  tlic rcal strcngtli of his position, or ns n cloiid of carnlrj i3 uscd 
R ~ c n c n l  to mask wliat Iic is goingsubrcqucntly to tell us. I thcrcforc npproacli 
Illis subjcct with r e r r  grcat caution, for I fccl that w? slinll licar in rcplg some- 
thing far mmc. forniidnblc nnd far  morc ~crioii3 tlian niijtliing tliat Ire 1133 put 
forward in  his pnpcr. Sir Iintorn Sinrmom fins told US Iic ngrccd with tlic praimblu 
of thc lccturc, nnd so do I. I nlso cntircly conciir in thc Inst paragrqdi, including 
t h t  quotation from what n’nlmleon sniil a t  St. Uclcna. But  lest anybody licrc 
S ~ I O U ~ ~  make n mistakc on this matter, Xnpolcon did not rcfcr, ~rlicn hc spoko of 
the “Jfarinc,” to tlic Roynl 3Iarincs or tLc Royal Xarinc Artillcry; lic rc- 
fcrred to tlic Xary of thc Empire, xrliicli WGS thc first nrni of tlic uation. And 
110 onc niorc than Napolcon ncliuonlcdgcd thc inlfucnco of E C ~  powcr on history. 1 
also concur largely with tlic last parqpph. But tlicrc i3 ono portion of this 
lccturc diicli,  EO far, ha3 not bccn dliidcd to, in which tlic nuthor rcferj to tlic 
constitution of tlio d r m r  nnd thc Xnrj, and hc puts it forward that, if hi3 pro- 
psition is prored, wc ~hou ld  hare unity of action and ~ i ~ i k y  of sjstcm, nud also 
Krcater eficicncy. KOT, I rcnturc to sar, and to put bcforc? you, that TO liarc :L 
Eccrctarv of Statc for War wlio presidce orer the drniy, wc hnrc nlso an Admiralty 
that pr&ides owr the  ICary; those arc two g c a l  dcpartmmts of tho Statc. Thc 
rcal  lead of the wliolc, tliat rliicli produce3 unity of dircction nnd of action, 
after 311, is the Priinc Minister of tho countT. Thercforc, whilst we hcar tliat tlic 
Coiiiiiiission was bcating nbout tlic bush, and, n3 it is tcrnicd, “on unsatiafactorj- 
and dangerous state of n5airsF because there were tno kcads and tno tail4 rcallj-. 
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886 TIIE SUPREJIACT OF TIIE S A V Y  
\v11at tlicg ivcrc looking for nlrcady cxistcd in tho coiistitutioii of 0111’ coltnt VV., 
:\nrl, gentlcincn, I do‘ think that, before plunging into sucli grcat cliang~s as a;r 
proposed licrc, we might tliink wlictlier, in tlic past histor1 of oiir count 
llnrc not, so far, ~ c c n  wry  successful, and whctlicr wc ought not to ‘ 1  
c:ircful bcforc ac makc a radic:il clinngc. I tpok up this qucstion nbout c 3  
;)go, when it was bcforc tlic I loy~ l  Conmiisslon, to  ECC how nian caccj tllelb 
xvc\rc in wliicli nnrnl ant1 iiii~itnry OlIiccrs had qmrrc11cd. I rcncIaJt1iat 1 coItld 
jind, :ind I could Iiardly fiiid one cnsc. I rcnd of China, of Indin, of the 
Capc, and of tlic Criiiica, and I tliink tlic Army will aclinowlcdgc that, llarill 
shut up tlic Russian Flcct, ivlicn xvc found that wc l i d  nothing inorc to do ail$ 
thc flcct :it ECP, \re dcnudcd oiir ships of men, ahcn  tlic Ariiiy rcquircd. tllcln, 
nnd wcnt into action with tliosc flccts against tho forts with only half tho c r c ~ ~  to 
our guns. I (lo not think tlint one profession could lime niorc cordially backcd 
:inotkcr. So i t  WLJ in Abyssinin; so it was in Ashantcc ; and so it ]ins Lccll in 
crcry part of tlic \rcrld wlicrc the two Scrricc~ 1ior.o l i d  t l ~ c  lioncur of scrrinl: 
their coiintrfs putpcsc. I harc stuclicd tlic case also from another point of ricIv. 
XOT that  wc arc relying upon our Voluntccr3, wc hnrc looked n t  tlic lcssons to b,. 
learncd froin ovcr tlic Atlantic. IYlicn tlic Unitcrl Stntcj found itself n t  wir, one 
portion against nnotlier, and had to crcatc lnrgc forces, tlic opcmticne wcrc TCrj 
large, n a r d  and inilitarr, tlic Soi-.r pullcd with tlic Arniy nr onc united forr.c. 
ll’licii I look at tlic Jrissiasippi, at CharIcstown, :it S c w  Orlcnns, n t  Jlobilc, at  the 
l’otoniac, a t  Ricliinond, I find hardly nu instmcc in x~hicli tlic Gcncrnls arlrl 
Aclniirals of tlic United Statcs n-crc not iii cntirc Iiariiiony. . I  find, tlic cxccptio& 
bciiig as nrc, tlic diffcrcnccs that occur arc in tlic iuin,~inntion ; t h y  nrc in tile 
iiiindj of tlocc wlio arc in tlic habit of creating lijpotlicticnl questions. a i d  dealing 
with t h i n  in tlicir inxigination. IIappilj, it is so in this countr~-, niicl I hope, and 
I fccl confilnt, it will long continue. But, gcntlcnicn, i t  is not only what is 
this pnpcr, but tv!int i3 bcliind it, that wc knvc t o  think of. Tlic word I ‘  filiauce” 
i3  hardly incntionrcl ~3 yet. Tliesc p c a t  cliangcs will ’cort n w r y  grcat dcal of 
iiioncy, and I, for onc, r g r c t  cxpcndituro rcry nuucli wlicii i t  i3 ~~nncccssary, nncl I 
think tlic Irctiircr will Iiavc to rnaintain that two armies arc uiorc cllicicrit a i d  arc 
ciicapcr tlian onc in order to car r j  liis point, and that iic will find it a r c r j  dificiilt 
tack to do PO. 
Thc JIarq1ii3 of Riros : I nni nfraid I must now 1c:irc tlic Chair. I am TVJ sorry 
to lure to do so, bccausc tlic siibjccl is r e r j  important, and ccrtainly tLc discusiolr 
is crtrcmcly interesting. S o u  w~uld  Iinrdly expect that  I E I I O U I ~  pas3 auy definite 
opinion on tlic propcsali submitted by niy gallant friend, particularly nftcr tliey 
Iiarc bccn EO strongly criticized by sonic of tlic spcalicrs that harc fclloncd him. If 
I Lad bccn ublc to rcmain to licnr Sir Williani Jcrrois’ reply, I might perhap3 
liarc couc to somo judicial decision in m y  own mind upon tlic point under discus- 
sion, but n t  tlic present molncnt i t  rvoi1lrl bc highly presumptuous, I may say, 
in m e  to cxprcss an opinion upon n subjcct aliicli is a lnattcr of such fair con- 
trorcrsy. I niii quite surc that tlic h 9 t  thing wliicli n i j  friend Sir IVilIinin 
Jcrx-ois thought of \v03 in any way to rnico up any ditliculty or unpleasant discussion 
betwccn thc Army ant1 tlic X~YJ-;, neither necd his pnpcr do so in tlrc ainallcst 
clcgrcc as far as I can sec. Thcsc qucstionr arc questions of rery grcit im- 
portance. Tlicy dciemc a ‘cry f i f  coniidcrntion. I tliink tlic originality of 
tlic paper is niiicli in its farour. It scts incii tliinliini. Xotliing can bc inorc 
iiitcrcsting thau, nftcr haring hcard 3 pnpcr of this kind, to licnr tho opinion of nicn 
so cininently compctcnt to E P C ~  LE Sir Ycscy II:iniilton, Sir Lintorn Simx~ions, nnd 
Sir George TrJon. I liarc no doubt tliosc vlio n-ill follow Rill nlso contribute 
grcntlr to tlic intcrrst of tlic discussion, nnd i t  is not n niattcr of cmiplimcnt citlicr 
to Sir \Villiani Jcrvois or to this distinguished nsscmbly, when I that it is with 
wry  grcat rcgrct I am obligcd, on account of m y  I’arlinincntnry cngagcmcuts, to  
Ir;ivc JOU nor ,  nud tlicrcforc not to Iiavc thc ndvantngc of Iicaring how this dis- 
cussion procccdr. I liopc o report of it may in cliic time reach mc, and I shall 
certainly girc it xny most careful nttcntion. For my o m  part, I tlinnk Sir William 
Jcrrois wry  much for Iiaring niml tlrie diwmion, and I think tlic points which 
Iic has brought bcfcrc us nre so acll  dcscrring of considenition that., olthoiigli 
I om far from rajing that I 60 not ECC r c g  considcrablc difficulty in cn-ing 
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t,hrln into practical cfhct, ricrcrtlic!cts I tliink i t  a r c r r  good thing that bcforc an 
:@,,,bly of this sort, nicn so thoroughiy conipctcnt ‘to deal r i th  thcsc matters, 
tLN rnrious qucstions should Iinvc bccn discusscil. 
LThc JIarquis of Ripon then lcft the Clizir, wliicli m s  t:ikcn byl?icld-?rInr~linl Sir 
cintorii Siininons.2 
Sir J. C. R. COLOUI, P.C.3I.G.. 3I.P. : I dioidd wry much Iikc to offer onc or two 
obgrvation3 upon thie rcry important subjcit, brought unclcr our noticc for discus- 
sio,l ; and nliatcrcr may bc our o h io i i s  upon tlic practicability of tlic suggstions 
,,.ell worthy of considerntion, and f113t his pnpcr b cxcccdinjy siiggcstirc and im- 
portant. Xow, Sir, my fccling upon (16s point I will cndcavour to state as eliortly 
ps ib lc .  I cannot cractly gather from hiin \rlicllicr 11c iiicnns to trnnsposc to 
xnyy tlic nliolc of tlic Ports, tlic ~ lro lc  of our grcnt G:irrisoIis 011 tho rcnboarrl 
~ ,~ I I IC ,  tlic tmo great Garrisons in tho llcditcmncaii, and the otbcr na\-:il baica 
orcr flit v-orld. If tliat is hi3 propod,  I cannot n-itli lliui; 1 Lclicvc it to 
bc iml~raclicnble, nnd I liarc nlwaj-s hcld it SO. IluL if Iris proposal i j  simply to 
,lcnl vitli what niny bc tcrnicd 11urcly nnvnl basc3, or ntlvanccd posts, thcii I 
CcrtninlJ- n p c .  And, first of all, would IIC allow IIIC to  point oiit tliis, and I 
illo~ild bc glad of an nnsivcr in. his rcply? Ilc gives 11s fifurcs with regard to tllc 
p~pcndituro n fortifications sincc 1659, and IIC draw3 ruarkcd attcntion to tlic fnct 
tllnt, comparing tlint crpcnditurc of orcr 17~000,000~. 011 fortifications 31011~ wit11 
tile nggrcptc of tlic cs cnditurc on tlic Army and Sary, Iic finds it  on11 2 ycl- 
ccnt., a n i l ~ i c  sap,  ‘‘LOO! wlict clicap tliings fortifications arc!” son-, I want to 
him this qucstion. Tlic fortifications riilc ;Four garrison3 : and, iii  ordcr cxactlr 
to makc an 3 C C l i ~ i I t C  FtPtCnICXlt, 1 tllillk i l C  S l i O d d  add to tllc cost of tlic fortifi- 
cations thc cost of thc garrisons, and tlint military crpcnditurc wliicli ha3 been thiIa 
incurred, siiirply brcanrc wc 1iam tlicsc hugc forlrcsrcs crcatcd b>- tlic Rcport of the  
~ o p l  Commission of 1883. I dacll  upon this for this rcason, that one of tllc 
diflicultics of thc sitiintion arises froin thc f w t  that, 3 considcr:iblc tiino n p ,  jyr 
crcatcd D certain etatc of things, and thc difliculty is to gct that stntc of tllings 
right. Sir Lintorn Siininons totallcd up a rast army, wliicl army m s  ncccssitatcd 
by a l i a t ?  lly tlic cxi~tcnco f fortifications. Itakc tlic cnsc of Portsmoiitli. 3 1 ~  
rcnding of tlrc Rop1 Conimission Ikport  was that for the local dcfcnce of Port& 
iiioutli t h y  ranic to thc conclusion tlint ccrtiin works of ccrtain capacity ant1 
position wcrc ncccssnry, and that tlioso morks noiild rcqnire a ccrtain niinibcr 
of men. Thcrcforc I think I am justilicd in pointing out that, if IOU 
crcnto n systcin of  fortification^ which arc unncccrsnrr, rou h3rc increscd the 
clifficultics of tlic situation by ncccesitating prrizons for their dcfcncc. 
iiiy opinion i t  is for this rcnson thc lccturcr Iiimsclf, I tliink, t d c 3  tllc 
proper nod accumtc ricn-, which is tllc Ticw I hare nlanys mysdf held, and I wish 
for thc intcrcsts of ccononiy and cfllcicncy that that r i c e  liad n l w q s  prevailed. 
Ilccnusc, nffcr nll, what dors it comc to?  It come3 to this, that thc.dcfcnco of all 
tlicrc nnral bnscs is a qncjtion of 1c3 clcfcncc, it is a qucstion of ~ca-faccs. c“ so, 
no.”] At  nll cvcnts, 1 am etoting niy 6 c v ,  and I will tcll you nliy. I statc EO 011 
thc authority of ono of the first military cnginccr3 in the world-thc lccturcr him- 
self-bccausc hc snjs in his pnpcr that “ tkc coast dcfcncc in tho British Empirc is 
primarily a dcfcnco of naral basca against raids.” Wcll, Sir, doc3 hc mean a naval 
mid, a3 I tnkc it hc docs, or doc3 lic mcan a military raid? I mcrdy dwll iipon 
tlicsc rords, vliich mnysccm dryand unintcrcsting,for tlic snkc of tr+g to crplnin 
my attitude nnd position on this question. I will supporc, for tlic sake of mnking 
injsclf clcnr, that, supposing ~ r c  could bcgin all afrcrli, nnd tliat wc liad tlrc 
Ilritkh Empire, and KO had, not mcrclr in tlicory but in practice, com lctc o m  
suprcmncy, and TC l i d  nothing clrc. I tliint cvcrjbody ~ o u l d  ngrcc; nn& tliosc 
circumstnnccs, r l i a t  JOU had to look to, as fnr n3 fortifications wcrc concerncd, 
xras the dcfcncc simply of tho ecn-faccs of your nwa1 dcpJts. But that is not tlic 
lircsent position. It is largcly tlic position in thc more rcmotc parts of thc ROdd. 
Tho lccturcr soid, what RC hnrc to consider is not the intcrcets of tho Army, 
or of tho h’nq-, not thc intcrcsts of this profcssion or of tlint profcssion, of this 
clcpartmcnt or of thnt dcpartmcnt, but d i n t  wc hare to considcr is tlic intcrcsts of 
tlic Statc, the work to bc clone, nnd liar to do it. ‘.Chat being eo, the work to  bc 
pntlc by tlic Iccturcr, wc must a1 1 bc agrccd that hc  has brou lit forward n subjcct 
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cloiic snrcly by onr dmy is, in thcsc Zap,  work in Asin, in conncction ”it.h 
India, or in hicricn,  in conncction with Canada. Xow, liaring crcatcd thosc largn 
yetc,lls of fortifications, you havc now lockcd up  o rcry cousidcrablc portion 
your briny nt wry  considcrJblc cast, and yo11 tlicrcby diminish your porc: for 
cffcctive nction in Indin or Canada. Ihcrcforc,’it i3 not merely o qucstion of the 
X~TJ-, but  i t  i3 also o qucstion of tlic Ariny, niid 1 s a j  i t  would bc due to tllc 
false principle of haring put up cxn,n:cratcd fortificntions to 61ipp1 what you 
t11ouglrt you mig~it  supply by fortificntions, tlic inxficicncy of your bcct .  you 
I l n ~ c  prcjudiced the cffrctirc und striking powr  of jour  Army. Xor  tlic lccturcr 
ondcr thosc circumstunccs conics ond sap, “ Wcll, now, as \re linrc crcntcd t]lc4 
fortifications, nnd tiicy arc rathcr lrliitc clcphants, let 11s Iinnd them a11 orcr to 
tlic Xa~y.” Son-, I objcct to takc this wliitc clcpliant, but I will tako what 1 
bclicrc to  bc ncccs:nry in thc intcrcsts of suprcniacy nt scn. I 1i:irdly likc to 
talk nbout liirtory in tlic prcscncc of my brotkcr and mnny otlicr Adinir& 
Ilerc, but niy rcdiiig of n a d  history is that it  is csscntid to tlic a.sscrtion of tlli3 
11ara1 siiprcmncy tl int  you should hai-c rcady a t  all tinics under nnral control a 
mobile, and arailnblc militnry forcc, to completc thc rcsiilts of tlic nction of yom 
Fleet. lion-, liorc jou got i t ?  You ~ J T C  not. You organitc an Ariiiy Corps, op 
t ry  to organizc oiic or two Army Corps to r o  nobody knows wlicrc, nn6 do iiobo(1y 
knows w h t ;  but, thc rcry first s h t c  of things ;rou 1 m ~ c  to facc i3 jour nayel 
siiprcmncy, and your striking poivcr at sca. \ ~ h c n  you p n s ~  to tlic l’acilic, if 
you arc nt nx with a Powcr tlint lias anyposscssions tlicrc, tlic first thing you hare 
t o  do under corcr of your iiawl supreinicy is to tnkc crcryoutlj-ing position of your 
cncmy. 1 1 0 ~  can $011 do tlint nlicn Four own forcc irlockcd up in )-our fortifications? 
‘I‘licreforc, I say, in yicw of tlic m s t  field orcr vliicli tlic X a v j  113s to opcmtc, in 
Ticw of thc growth ofcoiiirncrcc in distant parts of tlic world, I do visli to LCC the% 
OiitlJing positions tliat arc ncccssary to the Xary nxlcr IXIT~ control. And I add 
:inotlicr thing : I bclicrc i f  thc X a v ~  had bccn propcrly cons*dtcd wlien this poliq 
of fortiGcitioii wag cinbnrkcd in, J-ou would harc had morc modcmtc forti- 
ficntione to begin nitli. But  I claiin t1iat tlicrt.id 3 grcnt clcal to bc snit1 
in farour of linnding owr  tkc ndranccd pOst3. Gibraltar niid JZaltn, or I la l i fn~ ,  
in Ginida, ore not rcallj- so niucli n a r d  b31~3 as adrnnccd posts for an  arniy 
wiiicli 113s to opcratc in India or on tlic frontier of Cacadn. I put those in a 
totally cliffcrcnt catcgorj from c r c v  otlicr nard post in crwy otlier pnrt of tlic 
worl(1, and I group tlicm with Portsmoutli, 1’1~~n0~~11,  nnd tho grcnt naml bases 
:it, Itoiiic. I do SRJ, wit11 rcgnrd to tkc rninllcr port3 on thc iiiorc distant scns, and 
I 1m-c ninintainctl i t  for ncarly thirty jcan, that. they slioiiltl Lo rindcr iinral con. 
troll and that tlic 3Iarinc Arti l lcr~urc tlic proper iiicn to take charge of them. I sar, 
if war ddcs brcak out, yon can, from tlic rcsoiircc3 nt jour  back in ?lie sliapc of 
JIilitin and otherwise, make thcm arailnblc to strciigtlicii t l i ~  garrisons of tlicsc out. 
Ij-ing pl:accs, nnd you tlicn rclcasc thc ltlarinc Artillery n n d  Jlnrinci, so t h t  1-011 linrc 
&it, ycry iiiobilc forcc that thc ddniird on those scn3 W O I I ~ ~  bc likclr to want. On 
tho  nliolc, I nm in tho unliappyposition of bcing bctwccn tlic! two sidcs of thc nrgu. 
mcnt of this pnpcr ; I iicithcr agrec rritli tho lccturcr, if what kc means is to Ilnnd 
orcr this wliitc clcpliaiit, iior do I nltogctlxcr ngrcc, if I may prcsumc to disazrcc, 
with EO clistinguislicd an authority as Sir Lintorn Simmons. I r.rtlicr takc thc mcdiiiin’ 
vier with rcgnrd to thc clialigc3 going on iii thc world, tbc distaiicc3 nnd thc 
diflicultics of proriding tlic Aclniirals on distant statioiis with materials a t  tlicir 
command tlint tlicy ccrtainly will want in mar. I think wc should arrange thcsc 
mnttcrs in tinics of ’1)racc, nnd in order to cnsurc that co-opcration which is 
aiccrssnry bctrrccn a mili tav forcc and n a r d  power, I takc thc mcdium courec of 
s:iFing I tkiiil; it  \~oold bc visc grndunlly, iiot in a i.crolutionary wa but grxlunlly, 
to tnkc orcr and linnd to thc 3Zarincs and the BZarino Artillcry, u n z r  thc controlof 
tlic ddmiralty, tlie nard stations abroad, and crcntully all thc naval stations out 
of tlic catc-ory of tho grcnt garrisons. 
. AdmirafSir 1IocsroS S~E-FAI~T, C+.C.D. I 611alI dctain you with 3 few remarks, 
but bcforc commcncing I beg to say tint tlic~- will apply not to thc part of tlic pnpcr 
wit11 rcfcrcncc to Iiow the coast dcfcncc of tlic country slioulrl bc ninintninctl, btit 
principally conccrni?g Gibraltar ond Nalta. This i3 n rcmnrh-nblo paper, iiot only 
for the nblc .manner in irlxich thc subjwts arc trcatcd, but IU corning from n di- 
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FOR IJIPERIAL DEFEscE. 88 
t jng l l i s~~~d military Oniccr on d m s c  mind i t  appears that pcreonal cxpcricncc nncl 
omrrntion, ns i t  has donc on mhc, h3rC f o r d  tlic conviction tflat the prcmil. 
,+.m of conducting thc defcncc of Gibraltar, 3Inlta, otllcr inlportntlt p w .  
ports I~arc! mn in thc cliargc of 60mc of tlic niojt distinguish1 nmi in our rllaitary 11istor.y- 
one sitting not far froin mc now-garrisoned by thc fincst soldiers in tllc iyor1f1. 
I-rom rcpcntcd nnd cloec obscrration \rIiiIc scrring n t  diffcrcnt I,criocls ill tlrc JIcili- 
terrnnean of the working of the prcscnt sjstcm ns npparcnt a t  C;ibmItnr nlltl jInlta, 
I n_trcc with, in my opinion, tlic enlightened vicw avd sound collclllsion3 n3 CX- 
pred5~d in this p:ipcr. I rcgrct I am not of an I I ~ C  or In o position to sul,l,ort tllcni 
with thc influcncc and ability thcy dcscrrc. 1 ful1~- rccognizc that lllost iltl- 
portant considcr:.tions nrc inrolrcd in tlicsc p r o p o d  cliangcs, ~ v i ~ i ~ l ,  i t  ,,rorc 
lllo5t dillicult to bring into practical aorking : but I fnil niyiclf 10 eco or to gragl, 
nny insupcrablc obstacle if tlic rnluc of t l i ~  principlc is rccoKnizcd, cscept tilc 
trcniendons onc of la rcetcd iutcrcsts.” This grcat rock ail1 prore, I bclicrc, nI1 
i l i ~ ~ ~ p c r ~ b l c  o skiclc, and orcrsliado~ tlic wliolc sclicmc. Or1 sUcll, in tilc 
*inter scasons, Iilcasant stations as GibmItar and lIaltn, Ueofi posr;(le,,tcs. 
I t  i3 inipossiblc to discuss thcso various points in o niccting of tllis clcscri 
t.icn in a spacc of tcn minutes pcr roicc. I slraii not nttcmpt it, alld on[[ 
indicate in ia gcncnl \ray n i j  roiiciirrcncc in tllc opinions c x p c s j ~ ~ l  i l 
tllis p:ipcr. 
an rlemcnb of real sccurity to tlic Uritish Em irc, matcri:illp incrcaso 
tllc strcnpth and cllicicncr of the Arm? by uitli&oaing tlic broken Irrl,l 
.scnttcrcd f rqpcn t s  of Ilcgirncnt3 nnd uniting thcni in solid bodics undcr tllcir 
OIF~I propcr rcqimental Conim~nding Oniccrs, and nfibrd Oniccrs and IUCII illore 
cltcndcd prnctical cspcricncc with largc bodies of ineii in tlic ficld, instead of being 
phut up for )-car3 in such limitcd ~paccs ns JLa1t0 and Gibr:iltar. Can four or fire 
~ m r 3  conlincd in the barracks nnd town of Gibraltar rvitlioiit cvcr going outside tlic 
iirccincts of tlic forfrcs3 add citlicr to thc professional, pliysicnl, or moral stand:ird 
of tlic priratc’s gencml eflicicncy ns R soldicr, or nfford tlio niilitav practicc a i d  
development rcquircd for Oiliccrs in thc prcecnt day? This woiild not  Ire tlic casr 
with a nard nnd marine garrison, .for they would bc frcqucntly cinbarkcd anri 
clinngcd. I hat-e often rcrolrcd in my o m  mind tlic idcn of trcnting Gibmltnr nail 
lIn1tn ns stationarj Ship3 with rcgnd to tlicir defcnsirc orgnnization, to conip3rc I )  
small thing with (L Inrgc, lilic the island of &ccnsion, comariasioncd wit11 n rcguldr 
complcmciit of Olliccrs and mcn proportioned to  tlic rcquircmcnt3 of tlic locality and 
it3 clcfcncc, nnd placcd, Ekc otlicr ships of the Fleet, iindcr tlic Commnndcr-in- 
Chief of thc statiou, tbc lIarincs being cliangcd.nt intcrrals, that t h y  niay bc 
mored about nnd scmc nnoat in the shipa, nnd so yrcscrre their doiiblc 
Innd nnd E C ~  qiialilie~tions, which rcndcr them morc raluablc than any 
body of nicy undcr tlic Dritisk fl39 for the p r t i cubr  scrricc~ rcquircd by 
thi3 country in crcry part of thc Ihpi rc ,  esccpt India, ahere the Rcgulnr 
drmy nrc in their onn r p c r  splicrc : tllc guns on thc fortific3tions of thc snmc 
nnturc, mountcd and Tor cd ad thcy aro on baird tlic shi so that tlic pcrsonncl 
nn.3 mat6ricl of thc stationary rock sliip’aiid nonting iron A p  would 11c csc~iangc- 
abla to rciuforcc or assist tach othcr a3 requircd, OIIC uind  nnd undiridcd rcspon- 
ribility dirccting thc wholc A c n  co-opcratioii i3 rcquircd. JWicn iw look to  our 
position in India, tho largc Ih-opcan forcc \rc 11arc to mointniii thcrc, the possibly 
precarious tcnutu of Xntirc nlleginncc, thc Inrgc forco irc liarc to maintain tlicrc, 
\rhich in careof war in tlrat country xrould rcqtiirc all our Rcgiilar crirling Arniy to 
keep up in tho ficld, nrc we sunicient for thcsc. things? I supposc no onc will 
undcrtakc to  assert that-wir x d l  ncrcr come. If it conic may not Fmncc a id  
Russia bc ranged on the same side, anc \~odtI not snch an nlliancc of two grcaL 
Xilitnry l’owcrs call nll our best military forccs iuto tlic ficld, and out of tlic 
garrisons? It may bc said tliat, n3 was cloce during the Crimcan War, d e n  rcgi- 
mcnts were witlidmwn from Qibraltar, m l a ,  and Corfu, and rcnt to tlic front, tlio 
Militin froni home \rould takc tlicir place. Who is to t a b  tltc p!acc of tho lliliti t 
diicli during tlic course of n grcat war will bc rcquircd nt Iiomc, not only for t he  
dcfcncc of thc coiintry but to prorirlc rcinforccucnts for tlic nrmy ubroad. IVlicii 
thc campaign \rhich cndcd in l\‘atcrlco brokc out, tlic Vetcrandruy x s  across thc 
of tlic Empirc, is unsatisfactory and tl~crcforc dangerous. 
I ~ C ~ ~ C T O  tlic propom1 cliangcs vould rcnder tlic scia still 
YOL. YSSY. 3 I’ 
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s90 TIIE SUPllE3IhOT OF TIIE SAVT 
,\tlaiitic and thc Jfilitis was sent out’  to forni tho Duke of Wellington’s Arniy. 
Tllc Veteran Army may bc ncrO013 tlic llcd Sca, and wo mny find tho samc >rant of 
JliIitin n t  Iiomc. I n  crcry pliasc that I look upon this question, I rcturn to m;r 
first conriction, tlint its Effect would bc to rcndrr tlic sca still niorc an clcmcnt of 
rccurity to tlic British Empirc, nnd to incrcasc t l ~ c  poncr and c5cicncy of tke 
British Army. . 
Tllc meeting vas thcn adjourncd to lI*cdnesday, Jizly 1. 
ADJOIXSI:D L)ISCCSSIOS. 
J n l j  1, 1891. 
Trrc YOST Hos. TIIE 3IARQUIS O F  RJl’ON in the Clinir. 
Adiiiiral Sir E. R. FI~E~IASPLE, K.C.II.  C.3L.G. : M y  Lord Ripon, I:adic3, and 
gcntlciiicn, I fccl considcr:iiblc dillidcncc in rc-oiicriing this discussiou. It sccni~ to 
iiie ricccssnry, or, a t  all crcnte, t h t  i t  ~ o i i l d  bc convcnicnt, if I, to somc cstcnt, go 
orcr tlic dcbatc which took p1:icc licrc last Friday ; but I d l  bc n3 brief 03 poj. 
siblc. It appcarcd to  m c n n d  I tliink it mnat havc :ippcarcd to ninny of tliosa 
licrc prcrcnt-that in that discussion, \~IiicIi v a s  opcncd liy Sir Vcrcy li:imilton, 
followed by such diatinguislicd Ofliccrj as Sir Lintoru Siniinons and Sir Gcorgt 
‘l’rjon, our lccturcr rcccivcd ratlicr scant considcntion. It might lirvc bccn 
thought tlint lic wa9 an  abstract pliilosoplicr, wlio l i d  conic lierc to rcutilntc sonic 
fad of liis own. It could sc:irccly liarc bccn suppoacd by niiy outeidcr wlio liar- 
pmcd to Iiavc conic into this tlicatrc on tlint occasion, that wc vcrc bcing nd- 
clrcsscd by a wry  distinpislicd military Olliccr-a m:in who l i d  lind :L vcry Lrgc  
rrpcricxice, cspccially of fortiGc:itions, nnd who lind bccn lIcr Xajcsty’s trustrd 
rcprcscntativc in sonic of tlic largest of IIcr JInjeitfs Colonics. Sir Ycscry LIumil. 
toil nindc a very critical spcccli. I liarc tlic highcit rcspcct for our First Sc:, Lord. 
i t  is wry  ~ irc ly  that I fccl inclinrd, in tlic slightest manner alintcrcr, to  differ 
iron1 hiin ; but I do tliink tlint Iic, on tlint occasion, rathcr tiiisundcrstood tlic 
Iccturcr. H c  ccrtninl-r assunicd tlint it would bc tlic caw that tlic Xnry, if it had 
tlio responsiibi1it~- of tlicsc coiling statious-and cspccia!I of our largc fortilicd 
:irscnali, uould bc led away from its proper tvork. nnd wouh bc inclined to stop at 
Iioiiic. It nxiy bc that this ~rrould bc tho result of what thc lccturcr propom ; but 
i t% only fair to ~ i i n i  to my tiint 1ic rlistinctlg t1isclaimcci any such object, aud s:iid, 
011 t!ic coutr:iry, that liia object ~voultl be to cunblc tlic Ilritisli Flcct to do as tlicj 
1i:id a l w i ~ s  douc; tlint ir, to go to ee;t and sccli tlic cnemy. Sir Liutorn Siminons, 
speaking with his largc es]icric~icr, Inid that no lcr3 n numbcr tlinn GS,OOO mm 
woiild bc rcquirctl to iiinn nll the clcfcnccs of tlic orecnnlr and ports ; nnd I tliiiili 
lic fiaid tlint ut  lclst 12,OOO nicn woiiltl bc rcquircd for 3LaIta. KO\\-, I visli to 
kiiow, cnctly,  on )!lint groiind that 12,000 mcu is to  bc rcquircd for JInltn? I t  
dois strilic miic, ccrtninly, nr a narnl Ofliccr, that tlic wliolc qucrtioii would bc. 
What i 3 ~ o u r  nard position in tlic IIrditcrrancan? I s  it R position of roprciiiac~? 
Is i t  a position of doubtful ruprcmacy, or linrc 1-ou bccn drircn from tlic 3Icditcr- 
m n c n n ?  Surcly go11 c:innot e r  calhrdtci sny that tlicrc must bc a cctfnin nunibcr 
of troopj, rritlroiit any rc,nid to  our nard position in thc Jlcditcrrmcin? I sliould 
like nlso to reiuark, with rcgard to  this sccond ariny, as one of thc spcakcrs spokc 
of it-I tliink Sir Ccorgc ‘l’rjon-amounting to a Tcr: largc nnmnbcr OF mcn. It 
ccrtriiily sounds very forxnidablc. Tlic Iccturcr, I tliink, if I mav venture. to  
criticieo Iiiiii, v:is IL Iittlc too logical in spc:ikingof t~ i i s  iargC nrniy, an2 in nrsiiniing 
all tho soldicrs, all tlic forccs which ~ r o ~ d i l  bc uiidcr tlic.narn1 comiiianrl, nsjiiiiiin:: 
oiir grcat nnral nrzcnah to bc commandcd b~-, tlic Xary, to bc ncccssarily nttnclicd 
to t l i ~  Knvr, I m a n  bcing, in all dctnils of disiplinc, undcr tlic Bdmindtr. I t  
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